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Abstract
In the past, home automation was a small market for technology enthusiasts. Interconnectivity between devices was down
to the owner’s technical skills and creativity, while security was non-existent or primitive, because cyber threats were
also largely non-existent or primitive. This is not the case any more. The adoption of Internet of Things technologies,
cloud computing, artificial intelligence and an increasingly wide range of sensing and actuation capabilities has led to
smart homes that are more practical, but also genuinely attractive targets for cyber attacks. Here, we classify applicable
cyber threats according to a novel taxonomy, focusing not only on the attack vectors that can be used, but also the
potential impact on the systems and ultimately on the occupants and their domestic life. Utilising the taxonomy, we
classify twenty five different smart home attacks, providing further examples of legitimate, yet vulnerable smart home
configurations which can lead to second-order attack vectors. We then review existing smart home defence mechanisms
and discuss open research problems.
1. Introduction
As homes adopt Internet of Things (IoT) technolo-
gies and become increasingly smart by utilising networked
sensing and actuation, cloud computing and artificial intel-
ligence, they naturally become more vulnerable to threats
in cyber space. Some of these threats are entirely new.
The majority are not, but applying them in a domestic
context generates second-order threats to the physical and
emotional safety of the occupants to an extent not previ-
ously experienced. Here, we present a taxonomy of cyber
threats to smart homes already observed in the wild or
in controlled experiments, as well as potential future vul-
nerabilities exposed by specific smart home configurations
and technology adoption.
Smart home cyber security is usually addressed as an
extension of the smart grid, looking almost exclusively at
energy-related attacks [1]. This has begun to change. In-
dicatively, Lin and Bergmann [2] have taken a holistic per-
spective on smart home privacy and security, identifying
the combination and convergence of heterogeneous tech-
nologies, with lack of specialised security knowledge, as
two key challenges exacerbating the cyber threat to smart
home environments. Here, we look more deeply at the
technical building blocks of cyber threats to smart homes,
identifying key classification criteria that help to shape the
attack landscape. We do not claim that this taxonomy can
be exhaustive. However, in identifying and characterising
existing and potential future cyber threats to the smart
home, we are able to highlight motivations, resources, vul-
nerabilities and crucially their impact, so as to help estab-
lish the problem space for defence measures that would
address them.
2. Related Work
The smart home is not a fundamentally new technologi-
cal paradigm. So, although there has not been a taxonomy
of cyber threats for smart homes before, it is meaningful to
contrast against related work that is more general for IoT
or previously established areas, such as wireless sensor net-
works and networked embedded systems. In 2010, Babar
et al. [3] were the first to propose a taxonomy of IoT cyber
threats, but only provided a high-level overview of security
requirements and types of threats in terms of communica-
tion, identity management, storage management, embed-
ded security, physical threats and dynamic binding. More
recent work by Jing et al. [4] has looked at IoT security
from the perspective of security needs at the application
layer, the transportation layer and what they refer to as
the perception layer, which is where the data collection oc-
curs. The resulting architecture is effectively a taxonomy
of the types of threats at each layer, which, interestingly,
includes smart home security as one of the requirements
at the application layer, but does not elaborate further.
Another area of interest is privacy in IoT, where Ziegerl-
dorf et al. [5] have classified the impact of an IoT pri-
vacy breach as relating to identification, tracking, profil-
ing, privacy-violating interaction, lifecycle transitions, in-
ventory attacks and linkage. This is a well thought-out
taxonomy, but is naturally limited to privacy and does
not consider the technical properties of a smart home or
the second-order impact on its occupants. In Nawir et al.
[6], the authors have presented a taxonomy of IoT security
attacks, classified according to device property, location,
access level and protocol type. Their analysis includes se-
curity issues related to the healthcare, transportation and
smart home domains, but this classification is not present
in their taxonomy. Finally, a taxonomy of IoT based smart
environments is presented in the work of Ahmed et al.
[7], which classifies the IoT environment based on commu-
nication enablers, network types, technologies, local area
wireless standards, objectives, and characteristics. The se-
curity aspects are only briefly touched upon as part of the
technologies category.
In Table 1, we summarise existing taxonomies to high-
light the current perceived extensions of the security prob-
lem space in the smart home domain. We emphasise in
particular on the key security properties, the vulnerabili-
ties and particular factors making smart home IoT security
challenging, as well as any recommendations for security
and novel challenges for research as identified by each ex-
isting taxonomy.
Here, we consider the large variety of technical config-
urations of current smart homes, provide a detailed de-
scription of the attack surface and take into account each
attack’s impact on domestic life, as supported and shaped
by a smart home, extending to the potential impact on the
occupants’ physical and emotional wellbeing too.
3. A taxonomy of cyber threats to smart home
A primary motivation for developing this taxonomy is
to establish a systematic means for classifying attack vec-
tors and the their impact as a holistic view of cyber threats
within the context of the smart home. Hence, we are not
only concerned with identifying extant or emerging attack
vectors (e.g., as a result of technology convergence in the
household), but also establishing the physical, domestic
and emotional impact for human occupants. With these
objectives in mind, to direct the construction of taxonomy
criteria we start with the following questions:
• By what means can an attacker target the smart
home?
This involves identifying the different ways and con-
ditions by which an attack might be distributed and
automated in the smart home, which are vital to dis-
tinguish between explicit vulnerabilities in systems
and second-order threats which are manifested by a
household’s specific configuration.
• How is the cyber security of a smart home compro-
mised by an attack?
A consequence of technology convergence in the smart
home is the cascading effect of compromise of one
system to others. For example, a breach of confi-
dentiality, integrity and availability resulting from a
vulnerability in a single device may result in shared
exploitation across interdependent systems. A se-
cure system may be rendered vulnerable by the in-
securities of a lesser protected platform on which it
relies. Stealing the WiFi keys from the firmware of a
smart light-bulb inadvertently affects the confiden-
tiality of other devices connected to the same WiFi
access point.
• In what ways will cyber-physical systems in the smart
home respond to attacks?
Establishing the different ways in which physical sys-
tems respond to cyber threats is important in under-
standing the risks to occupants and even for detect-
ing threats by monitoring both cyber and physical
system behaviour.
• What are the direct consequences of an attack for
smart home occupants?
Conventional security breaches in cyberspace typi-
cally result in financial loss, breaches of data privacy
or loss of control of computer devices. In the smart
home, by compromising or disrupting household ap-
pliances and systems, the consequences can extend
not only to cyberspace but also to physical space,
whereby the physical privacy, safety and well-being
of occupants are threatened.
• How do occupants experience the impact of different
attacks against the smart home?
Smart homes are typically set up for convenience,
security and energy efficiency, but these can all be
severely disrupted by a cyber security breach, lead-
ing to adverse experience on the affected users’ daily
lives, ranging from mild inconvenience to loss of time
and intense frustration due to goal blockage.
• How will occupants respond emotionally as a result
of an attack against the smart home?
While different people respond differently, stress, anx-
iety and privacy-seeking behaviour [8] are some of
the expected short-term and long-term effects that
need to be taken into account.
We use this set of questions as the basis for our root
taxonomy criteria: Attack Vector, Impact on Systems and
Impact on Domestic Life. In the following sections, each
set of answers is translated into specific categories with
relevant examples observed in the wild or carried out as
research experiments.
In Figure 1, each of the root classification criteria is
shown with basic high-level interactions. These interac-
tions represent causal relationships which can be used to
generate a classification of a smart home cyber threat. In
section 7, we practically demonstrate how these interac-
tions are represented as linearly separable steps, irrespec-
tive of the number of attack vectors and variable impact
they may have. Moreover, we highlight how this approach
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Table 1: Summary of existing taxonomies with applicability in smart home cyber security
Reference Key security properties Vulnerabilities/challenges Security recommended Open problems identified
Komninos et al. [1]
Confidentiality Connected to Internet Auto-immunity to threats
Resilience Physical tampering
Reliability, availability
Lin et al. [2]
Confidentiality Phys./netw. accessibility Gateway architecture Auto-configuration
Authentication Constrained resources Updates
Access control Heterogeneity
Nawir et al. [6]
Smart meter integrity Remote connectivity Techn. countermeasures Standardisation
Privacy Physical tampering Regulatory initiatives Impact evaluation, metrics
Non-repudiation Malicious actuation Intrusion detection
Authorisation Logging for audit/forensics
Ziegeldorf et al.[5]
Privacy Identification Detection of sensitive content
Tracking
Profiling
Linkage
Figure 1: Causal relationship between root criteria in smart home
cyber-threat taxonomy
can be used to benefit different types of research related
to the cyber security of smart homes.
4. Attack vector
IoT proliferation, integration of sensors, actuators and
low-powered wireless communications in domestic house-
holds, alongside traditional home-broadband WiFi and In-
ternet services, have positioned the smart home as a nexus
of information technology connectivity. In the past, these
technologies were typically designed and reserved for spe-
cialist environments, such as industrial control, embedded
sensing or medical data collection. In the smart home,
they have now converged within a general consumer land-
scape. In a positive sense, the smart home becomes a
catalyst for the transformation of domestic life through
ubiquitous access to rich and interactive technology. How-
ever, almost paradoxically, it also inherits the emerging
risks and vulnerabilities that come with the dependency
on these technologies.
Within the context of the smart home, it is the oc-
cupants who make the ultimate decision to install a new
wireless security lock, presence sensor or voice-controlled
assistant, as privacy and security concerns are carried out
according to occupants’ risk attitude [9], personal and so-
cial circumstances. By comparison, for smart offices and
smart cities, introducing IoT systems requires rigorous
ethical, policy and even legislative evaluation before de-
ployment. This positions the smart home in many ways
as a pilot environment for future deployment of emerging
IoT technologies to wider public contexts ([10, 11]).
For the immediate future, the smart home technology
landscape is likely to be volatile, consisting of both legacy
and emerging IoT platforms, each with their own security
risks. The threat landscape relates to the communication
medium and control software used, as well as threats in the
supply chain, side channel attacks and the sensory channel.
Below, we detail each of these categories with examples.
4.1. CM (Communication medium)
This is the means by which sensors, actuators, devices
and applications communicate in a smart home. It is
symptomatic of rapid innovation within the field of IoT
that several communication protocols deployed within the
smart home will become obsolete over time. Consequently,
the technologies evaluated in this taxonomy constitute by
no means an exhaustive list, but at the time of writing,
all are implemented within a range of smart home tech-
nologies and platforms and have been shown to contain
technical vulnerabilities that have been exploited.
4.1.1. CM-HI: Home Internet
Internet-connected households are by no means a new
phenomenon. However, the advent of the smart home has
positioned home internet connectivity as one of the pri-
mary gateways for attackers to gain access to devices, sen-
sors and actuators in the household traditionally isolated
from the outside world.
Although home Internet is served externally to the
household via physical (e.g., copper or fibre broadband
cabling) or wireless means (e.g., cellular), as a communica-
tion medium, it can be targeted both directly or indirectly.
For example, direct targeting attempts to identify the pub-
lic IP address assigned to the home internet gateway in
order to fingerprint services exposed to the Internet. Indi-
rect targeting relates to solicited connectivity via the home
Internet connection originating from internal smart home
devices or occupants toward Internet resources, which are
under the control of an attacker (e.g., a compromised cloud
service or a household occupant opening a phishing email).
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Figure 2: Smart home attack Vector classification criteria
As the vast majority of smart home platforms rely on
the home Internet gateway to reach respective cloud ser-
vices in order to function, if an attacker can compromise
a smart home Internet gateway they may be able to dis-
rupt or gain control of almost every Internet-connected
device in the household. Stamm et al. [12] have illus-
trated that by simply accessing a malicious web page an
attacker can execute a Java applet with code on the client
device that fingerprints home Internet routers’ internal IP
addressing. On accessing the attacker web page, a basic
script is executed that establishes a reverse socket con-
nection back from the household client to the attack web
server, where the returned client IP address provides an
indication of the internal addressing schema. This is sub-
sequently used to enumerate whether web services (i.e.,
router administration websites) are hosted on any inter-
nal addresses, followed by identification of different router
models by querying web page content found (e.g., logos,
text). Once a router model is recognised, an attacker then
issues a login query with the model’s default vendor cre-
dentials (which are often not changed by household users)
in order to access the home Internet gateway and change
key configuration settings. With this type of threat, no
specific vulnerability of the home Internet medium is ex-
ploited. The authors have argued that reliance on the
default control of blocking all unsolicited inbound connec-
tivity creates a false sense of security, as this type of access
can be achieved by home users mistakenly running mali-
cious code on internal devices which subsequently provide
access to the internal network, where all outbound connec-
tivity and home internet router administration is enabled
by default.
As of May 2018, an initial report by Cisco Talos dra-
matically reinforced the growing vulnerability of home in-
ternet gateways by identifying a large scale advanced per-
sistent threat against SOHO routers titled VPNFilter. Anal-
ysis of VPNFilter revealed a modular, multi-stage malware
capable of conducting intelligence gathering activities, as
well as possessing “kill switch” denial of service capabil-
ities against LinkSys, MikroTik, Netgear, Qnap and TP-
Link SOHO router platforms typically deployed as home
network internet gateways. Consisting of a three stage
infection and command and control process, stage one in-
stalls a persistent boot loader into BusyBox or Linux based
firmware, attempting to create an initial connection to an
attacker server by downloading from seed URLs originat-
ing from Photobucket.com which then extract server IP
addresses hidden in image EXIF meta-data; in the event
of failure, a backup domain toknownall.com is used with
the same process. Stage two proceeds to download a non-
persistent module from the attacker server, running in a
local working directory which contacts a C2 server to ex-
ecute commands. Stage three expands the malware func-
tionality by installing a non-persistent packet sniffing mod-
ule which intercepts traffic and attempts to extract HTTP
authentication strings, as well as a communication plugin
for remote communication over Tor.
The researchers claimed that since 2016 VPNFilter may
have compromised over 500,000 SOHO routers in over 54
countries (many of which were common household inter-
net router devices). They also noted that whilst no known
exploits were uncovered regarding the initial infection vec-
tor, many of the infected home routers discovered were
old or unpatched with widely known vulnerabilities, open
source exploits and typically shipped with default login
credentials.
4.1.2. CM-WD: Wired
Wired communication is increasingly rare in smart home
environments, although still practical for applications that
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require very high throughput rates, such as video stream-
ing from multiple security cameras, or would benefit from
the natural physical protection to sniffing and interference
that wires can offer over wireless. Of course, this does not
protect against attacks that have penetrated the network
and may originate from the Internet or from inside the net-
work, such as malware infections and social engineering.
Generally, within the home environment fully-fledged
structured cabling is undesirable and impractical due to
installation requirements. However, where a building’s
construction may introduce undue attenuation to wire-
less transmission signals (e.g., through steelworks or thick
brick walls), often this has led to utilisation of existing
power-line wiring for transmitting data between devices.
4.1.3. CM-WD-X: X10
One of the oldest home automation protocols, X10 was
designed for power line communications. Improvements on
the X10 protocol resulted in the A10 protocol, but without
any added security. In 2011, researchers demonstrated a
device that can be plugged into a power outlet outside a
building to jam the X10 signals that control lights, doors,
air conditioning and physical security systems [13].
4.1.4. CM-WD-K: KNX
Like X10, KNX is a relatively old home and building
automation system that was designed to provide connec-
tivity between heating, ventilation, air and cooling systems
which in the past had no means of communicating to re-
port their status or to provide remote configuration. Over
time, IP extensions have been built into KNX gateways
to facilitate greater functionality and integration between
system components in home and building automation de-
ployments. However, by leveraging IP-to-KNX connectiv-
ity [14], Antonini et al. have demonstrated a practical
attack against a real-world KNX home automation plat-
form, by successfully sending arbitrary commands to ac-
tuators. The attack is achieved by distributing a malware
from a compromised IP host to KNX enabled actuators
over the IP-to-KNX network gateway, no-password pro-
tected actuators execute arbitrary commands within the
malware command-set causing an operating system reset
which amounts to a DoS impact. In the case of password
protection, the malware simulates a device malfunction
over the KNX network (as device actions are not authen-
ticated or verified), which results in controller reprogram-
ming of the actuator with its password; as KNX does not
use packet encryption, the resultant plaintext passphrase
sent over the network is then sniffed over the network by
the malware and used to reprogram KNX actuators.
4.1.5. CM-WD-H: HAPCAN
The Home Automation Project based on Controller
Area Network (HAPCAN) is an open source hardware
framework which has been developed using the CAN 2.0B
standard [15]. Analysis of the HAPCAN specification show
a potential design flaw in the communication protocol which
may allow an attacker to exploit the arbitration mecha-
nism within the CAN bus. A rogue node can exploit the
arbitration mechanism within CAN by constantly trans-
mitting message IDs with a dominant bit set on the bus.
The arbitration mechanism processes message IDs with the
dominant bit (0) with a higher priority over the recessive
bit (1), i.e. a packet with message ID of 0000 will have
higher priority over a packet with message ID 1111, thus
by constantly submitting a message ID of 0 to the bus
an attacker will take over the control of the arbitration.
This attack leads other modules on the bus being starved
of communication between each other, which effectively
makes them unavailable.
In HAPCAN, denial of service can also be achieved by
exploiting the fact that all nodes are interconnected in se-
ries, and therefore a failure of one module affects overall
availability. Furthermore, as HAPCAN utilises the CAN
protocol, the protocol itself is at risk to several additional
CAN vulnerabilities, such as request overload and false
request to send [16], or rogue node packet amplification
exhausting [17]. Here, it is important to note that an at-
tacker requires physical access to the communication bus,
e.g., by implanting a rogue node through the supply chain.
4.1.6. CM-WD-U: Universal Power Bus
Universal Powerline Bus (UPB) is intended to be an
X10 replacement with superior reliability (lower suscepti-
bility to powerline noise and increased range). However,
UPB has no encryption and therefore any attack that is
able to sniff data from the powerline (such as using a rogue
UPB node) is able to read and inject data in the network.
4.1.7. CM-WD-H: HomePlug AV
In 2010, Puppe and Vanderauwera conducted a re-
search project into the security of the HomePlug AV pro-
tocol [18]. They were able to execute dictionary attacks
against the Devolo dLAN HomePlug’s use of 56-bit DES
network encryption within 20 minutes. Furthermore, it
was shown that a simple DoS attack could be executed
by doctoring the rate at which an attacker HomePlug de-
vice sends management packets (which are broadcast to
all HomePlugs’ in the network), whereby packet loss on
a member HomePlug was shown to be as high as 30% on
receiving a high rate of management packets sent with the
wrong network encryption key.
In 2014, Tasker [19] demonstrated how to infiltrate a
HomePlugAV network, using the ON Network’s PL500
HomePlugAV device . Tasker identified that the MAC
address of a HomePlug powerline station (STA) is used
to derive a Device Access Key (DAK), which in turn can
be used to tell target STAs to join a rogue HomePlugAV
network. HomePlugAV traffic can be passively sniffed to
identify MAC addresses to calculate the DAKs of available
STAs and enrol them on the attacker network. Whilst this
causes a temporary outage of the STAs if connected to
an existing network, it is momentary and if the attacker
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leaves the network, normal communication with the legit-
imate HomePlug network will resume (thus the intrusion
can go unnoticed by a occupant). Here, a successful attack
allows for complete access to target data and it was identi-
fied that at that time at least eleven brands of HomePlug
AV device were vulnerable to the attack due to the DAK
derivation method used to join the network - which if left
unchanged makes the attack practically indefensible. A
similar, but more complicated attack against DAKs was
undertaken in [20], whereby a DAK passphrase generation
technique was implemented to gain access to a neighboring
HomePlug AV network.
For attacks against HomePlug devices to be practical,
access to the same power line is required, for example
within an apartment complex with a shared power feed,
as practically demonstrated by Dudek [20] between two
apartments in the same tower block in France.
4.1.8. CM-WD-L: LonTalk
LonTalk is a building and home automation protocol
optimised to control actuation and sensing devices as part
of a LonWorks platform, originally developed in propri-
etary format by Echelon Corporation, but now adopted as
a ISO/IEC standard. Like other wired powerline building
automation protocols ported to the smart home environ-
ment (e.g., X10, UPB, KNX). Despite recent resurgence
of LonTalk as a viable means of smart home automation,
the protocol has been assessed to be insecure by default
by a cryptanalysis report in 2015 [21]. Specifically, the EN
14908 algorithm used by LonTalk as part of its the Open
Smart Grid protocol implementation uses a 48-bit key en-
cryption key which can be trivially bruteforced [22]. An
online article by BusinessWire reported that LonTalk was
estimated to be implemented in over 90 million devices
world-wide as of 2010.
4.1.9. CM-WD-DS: digitalSTROM
Recently, Brauchli and Li [23] identified viable attacks
on digitalSTROM (DS), a smart home system with grow-
ing popularity throughout Europe based on home power-
line networking. DS uses a proprietary unencrypted pro-
tocol (DS485) [24], typically consisting of an optional DS
server and at least one DS meter and filter per circuit,
with a number of terminal blocks connected to a DS chip
for each device (e.g., fridge, fire alarm, heater, coffee maker
etc.). Brauchli and Li have discussed theoretical attacks,
such as uploading power readings to a remote server for
occupancy detection to manipulating lights and household
appliances, by exploiting the DS Android app’s public in-
terface through an Android intent cross-app message on a
compromised smart phone. Whilst a compromised smart-
phone is required as an entry vector into the powerline,
once this is established, the DS protocol provides unre-
stricted access to launch arbitrary commands against any
connected appliances.
4.1.10. CM-Wireless
The majority of modern smart homes utilise wireless
communications and as a result are vulnerable to the se-
curity threats that are inherent in a wireless medium. For
example, the signals containing sensor data or actuation
commands can be captured by an adversary in the vicin-
ity, which makes strong encryption and countermeasures
against replay attacks particularly important. At the same
time, wireless control can be rather trivially disrupted via
communication jamming.
4.1.11. CM-WI-W: WiFi
As most homes already have a Wi-Fi router, Wi-Fi is a
common technology for connecting to smart home devices,
such as a smart lights and smart plugs. However, security
wise this also makes the Wi-Fi router the central point of
failure of the smart home setup. This is significant be-
cause there are multiple free applications available on the
Internet for acquiring the password for Wi-Fi connections.
Interestingly, by having access to the home Wi-Fi pass-
word, it may also be a smart home device that exposes
it. This is the case where devices, such as smart light
bulbs, need to communicate network configuration data
between them. Masquerading as a new light bulb joining
the network, researchers have demonstrated how to access
security credentials, such as the home Wi-Fi password if no
security measures are taken specifically for the light bulb
to light bulb communication [25]. A practical example of
such an attack was demonstrated by Chapman in 2014
against the LIFX lightbulbs [26], where in the presence of
more than one bulb, a master is elected and network con-
figuration and information is passed between master and
slave bulbs using an insecure IPv6 over low-power wireless
personal area networks implementation.
WiFi de-authentication attacks present a well-known
vulnerability in the 802.11 protocol and can be utilised
to lead to denial of service with de-authentication pack-
ets, or as a mechanism to perform Wi-Fi Protected Access
(WPA) password cracking via sniffing a household WiFi-
enabled device’s WPA 4-way handshake after they have
been de-authenticated from the WiFi access point. In the
same context, de-authentication can also be used to mount
phishing attacks. For example, WiFiphisher can be used
to execute a de-authentication attack for firstly discon-
necting user devices (e.g., mobiles, tablets etc.) from the
household WiFi access point, followed by a “Evil Twin”
man-in-the-middle attack (e.g., SSID spoofing) to collect
WiFi passwords from the unsuspecting occupants [27]. Here,
the fact that WiFi is such a common protocol benefits the
attacker, as there are several tools (indicatively, Aircrack-
ng, MDK3, Void11, Scapy, Zulu and open-source project
wifijammer software) and off-the-shelf hardware devices
(indicatively, nodeMCU with ESP8266 DeAuther [28] and
the WiFi Pineapple device [29]) that are readily available.
WiFi de-authentication is by no means new, but in the
context of the smart home, the loss of WiFi means loss
of Internet connectivity in the household, on which IoT
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platforms are increasingly dependent in order to function.
Whilst the vulnerability in question was addressed in 2009
by introduction of the 802.11w RFC, which strengthened
the authenticity and integrity of WiFi management pack-
ets, consumer-based router manufacturers do not often im-
plement this extension into their WiFi protocol stack. So,
even though 802.11w is available in most recent Linux ker-
nels and Windows OS (since Windows 8), often this fea-
ture must be disabled in order for it to be compatible with
household WiFi routers.
A newer type of WiFi attack that can affect a smart
home is the key re-installation attack (KRACK) [30], which
targets the four-way handshake of the WiFi WPA2 en-
cryption protocol. To connect to an access point with
WPA2 security, a Linux or Android-based device negoti-
ates a unique session-specific encryption key using a four-
way handshake, where the key is installed after receiving
message three out of four. However, to cope with lost or
dropped packets, an access point will retransmit message
three if an acknowledgement is not received from the con-
necting device, and each time this message is received, the
target device reinstalls the same encryption key; thereby
resetting the nonce value (in each packet) and receive re-
play counter. In this case, an attacker can force nonce
resets by collecting and replaying message three. This can
be used to decrypt, replay packets and even inject new
packets depending on the target protocol. Linux and An-
droid operating systems (OSs) are particularly vulnerable.
In January 2018, the WiFi Alliance released new WiFi
security enhancements entitled “WPA3”. WPA3 includes
new protections and enhancements on the existing WPA2
standard, such as default unauthenticated encryption to
public networks, individual device data encryption (aiming
to prevent complete compromise of the network if the WiFi
key is compromised), protection against key re-installation
attacks (e.g., KRACK), as well as prevention of brute-
force attacks (through rate-limiting of device connectiv-
ity). WPA3 also mandates Protected Management Frames
as part of the certification (which has also been extended to
WPA2), preventing forced de-authentication attacks from
occurring [31]. However, as with WPA2, there remains no
specific mechanisms to address the threat of Evil Twin ac-
cess points where an attacker may strategically force un-
suspecting smart devices to fall-back to a more insecure
version of the WPA2 security standard (or no WPA protec-
tion at all). Furthermore, the expected lengthy transition
period from WPA2 to WPA3 for all WiFi enabled house-
holds and SOHO devices worldwide means that existing
WiFi vulnerabilities are likely to pertain for an unknown
length of time. More generally, growing reliance on WiFi
connectivity as an enabler of the smart home continues po-
sitioning this communication medium as a key target for
attacks that aim to disrupt and gain access to the house-
hold, whether by disrupting WiFi services or compromis-
ing vulnerable devices which rely on WiFi for connectivity.
4.1.12. CM-WI-ZG: ZigBee
ZigBee is one of the most popular protocols used in
smart homes. An example attack that has been demon-
strated in the smart home cyber security literature is a
sinkhole attack [32], where a rogue node infiltrates a net-
work of ZigBee wireless sensors and increases its trans-
mission power, so as to be able to reach the ZigBee co-
ordinator with fewer hops and as such be preferred by
the Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing
protocol used for routing packets by the other sensors. In
this position, the rogue node can choose not to forward
the packets (and consequently the sensor data or the ac-
tuation commands) to their legitimate destination or to
modify them before doing so. Notably, performing attacks
in ZigBee networks is facilitated by readily available ex-
ploitation frameworks, such as KillerBee [33].
ZigBee and emerging IPv6 over Low power Wireless
Personal Area Network technologies, such as Google’s open
source protocol Thread, rely on the IEEE 802.15.4 radio
standard for physical layer and media access control. Jenk-
ins et al. [34] have demonstrated how different imple-
mentations between 802.15.4 radio receivers can be used
to achieve device fingerprinting and facilitate targeted at-
tacks, distinguishing between a device that uses ZigBee or
Thread (or another future protocol), then identifying the
product vendor allows attackers to analyse the smart home
and target known vulnerabilities in its devices.
4.1.13. CM-WI-Z: ZWave
Devices using the Z-Wave communication protocol can
implement the Z-Wave security layer, which uses symmet-
ric cryptography to provide encryption and authentication
services, so as to limit sniffing, replaying and injecting
wireless commands. However, different Z-Wave devices
share the same secret key. So, physical access to an ex-
ternal sensor, such as a passive infrared sensor outside the
property can help access the key, which could work also
for the front door, as demonstrated in [35]. A comprehen-
sive hacking toolkit named EZ-Wave has been developed
by Hall and Ramsey for exploiting Z-Wave networks using
software-defined radios. The EZ-Wave toolkit is built on
top of the Python Scapy-radio library and consists of a net-
work discovery and active network enumeration functions,
device interrogation to elicit device name, firm versions,
configuration settings and execution of supported com-
mand classes, as well as determination of Z-Wave’s module
generation using physical network layer (packet preamble
length) manipulation [36]. The authors also demonstrated
that Z-Wave toolkit can facilitate attacks which result in
cyber-physical impact on smart devices, with an exam-
ple of causing vulnerable Z-Wave enabled industrial and
compact fluorescent light bulbs to fail (the latter of which
are commonly used in modern homes). With two Hack-
RFs, EZ-Wave was utilised to request supported capa-
bility classes exposed by the Z-Wave devices’ application
program interface (API), executing these unauthenticated
due to lack of encryption on the device. This allowed the
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researchers to repeatedly turn on and off the Z-Wave en-
abled industrial and compact fluorescent bulbs in 1 s “on”
and 3 s “off” cycles, causing them to break [37].
4.1.14. CM-WI-B: Bluetooth
Bluetooth is becoming increasingly common in smart
home environments. That is because it is at the same time
an efficient communication protocol and a good mecha-
nism for evaluating proximity through signal strength (es-
pecially Bluetooth Low Energy). In [38], Ho et al. have
described how two attackers can unlock a smart lock using
a Bluetooth relay device. If attacker A is in close proxim-
ity to the legitimate user and attacker B near the lock,
then when B touches the smart lock to begin the touch-
to-unlock procedure, the message containing the authenti-
cation challenge is captured by the Bluetooth relay device
and is forwarded to attacker A (via Wi-Fi or some other
communication channel). Upon receiving the relayed chal-
lenge, attacker A broadcasts it masquerading as the lock,
and this is received by the legitimate owner’s device, which
returns a legitimate response. Attacker A captures this
and relays it to attacker B, and in turn to the smart lock,
which accepts it and unlocks. Similar attacks have often
been demonstrated for unlocking cars that feature keyless
entry [39].
4.1.15. CM-WI-N: NFC
Over the last decade, Near Field Communications (NFC)
has considerably evolved from its original inception in Ra-
dio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology. In stan-
dard RFID platforms, systems utilise short range wireless
communication medium at low frequency ranges (30-300
KHz); commonly consisting of an identification tag (e.g.,
transponder), which responds passively by reflecting a sig-
nal or actively by broadcasting a signal. NFC (and by
extension RFID), are commonly used in physical security
systems, such as door entry or physical authentication sys-
tems across a variety of industries which require physi-
cal security controls (e.g., corporate building access, hotel
room keys [40]). Within the context of the smart home,
NFC technologies have been employed to provide the same
benefits for physical security, as users are able to utilise
their mobile devices as front-door keys.
However, due to a lack of definable NFC wireless com-
munication standards and a proliferation of NFC-enabled
systems, a number of vulnerabilities have been found across
a range of NFC implementations. For example, NFC is
vulnerable to remote eavesdropping attacks assuming that
an attacker has a powerful enough receiver to capture a
NFC signal [41] (by design, NFC requires extremely close
proximity between the transponder and receiver, e.g., up
to 10 cm). However, based on the device’s role (i.e. ac-
tive or passive communication) which is limited by the
type of device (e.g., mobile, payment card etc.), the viable
distance for an attacker can vary from 1 m to about 10
m. NFC implementation is often application-specific and
even vendor-specific, in many cases omitting security mea-
sures. Haselsteiner et. al. [42] have demonstrated data
corruption, data modification, data insertion and man-in-
the-middle attacks against NFC systems. Other attack
vectors have been suggested by Francis et al. in [43], who
have demonstrated that it is possible for an RFID tag to
be replayed or emulated on a NFC-enabled device. In one
example [44], a cloning procedure was successfully imple-
mented through the emulation of the behaviour of a legit-
imate NFC token .
4.1.16. CM-BC: BidCos
The Bidirectional Communication Standard (BidCos)
is a wireless communication protocol operating at the 868
Mhz frequency and developed for the HomeMatic smart
home system, used primarily in Germany. Whilst the Bid-
Cos protocol claims to support AES-128 encryption, it has
been shown by Laufer et al. [45] that the encryption is
used for authentication purposes only and that any data
exchange taking place is actually unencrypted and does
not provide data confidentially. In [46], Kodra has demon-
strated that this allows an attacker to easily sniff data on
the BidCos network. Moreover, the protocol data unit [47]
also allows an attacker to replay packets on the wireless
network, which Kodra has demonstrated experimentally
against a Homematic testbed in [46]. In [45], Laufer et al.
also demonstrated that it was possible to register a mali-
cious node on the smart home network or reconfigure the
system in such a way that nodes would change their control
unit, if the user had not changed their default password
(which was highly likely, because at the time an imple-
mentation bug was causing authentication problems if the
password had been changed).
4.1.17. CM-WI-I: Insteon
Insteon is a home area network protocol that utilises
both wireless and wired connectivity to create a dual-mesh
topology for communication between devices. The proto-
col aims to enforce network security via link control so that
users cannot create links which would allow control over a
neighbour’s smart home, but researchers have shown that
the RF process is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks,
as Insteon device IDs can be easily sniffed. At DEFCON
23, Peter Shipley demonstrated that by reverse engineer-
ing the Insteon RF transmission protocol and its Cyclic
Redundancy Check (CRC) algorithm, in reality, it did not
use or enforce any encryption in the link-layer at all [48];
allowing attackers to sniff traffic, conduct replay attacks
and issue arbitrary actuation commands.
4.2. CS: Control Software
Control software refers to the methods by which de-
vices in the smart home are monitored, configured and
operated (e.g., to trigger actuation, request sensor data or
install updates). Control software is a prime target for at-
tackers, where diverse software features can expose attack
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vectors through use of third party apps and vulnerabilities
in the operating system or firmware.
4.2.1. CS-3PA: Third party apps
One of the key drivers of innovation and adoption of
smart home technologies is the emergence of programming
frameworks that facilitate the development of third party
apps, for the same manufacturer or for integration of de-
vices across multiple manufacturers. Popular examples
are the Samsung SmartThings SmartApps, Apple Home-
Kit apps and Vera apps. In 2016, Fernandes et al. [49]
carried out static analysis, runtime testing and manual
analysis of 499 SmartApps and found that more than half
of them were over-privileged due to too coarse-grained ca-
pabilities. Notably, one of the key threats demonstrated
was remote lock-picking via a backdoor pin code injec-
tion attack. The exploitation functioned by allowing the
researchers to generate a HTTPS link that led to the au-
thentic SmartThings login page, which then exploited a
flaw in the app allowing redirection of the user credentials
(once submitted) from the SmartThings webpage to an
attacker-controlled domain. Crucially, it was noted by the
researchers that coarse permission binding between smart
apps and smart devices was often forced upon the devel-
opers by the integration framework used. For example,
analysis of the API exposure between Samsung Smart-
Things platform integration and a Zwave lock highlighted
that the device is exposes all of its capabilities to the
SmartThings platform such as “capability.actuator, capa-
bility.lock, capability.battery ... etc.”. The researchers
remarked that a smart app requesting one of these API
functions will be prompted by SmartThings for user au-
thentication, which then provides the requested access to
the Zwave lock device. However, following successful au-
thorisation, the user’s smart app not only gains access to
the requested resource, but also to all of the other afore-
mentioned capabilities exposed by the Zwave lock device
at the same time. As a result, the smart app is granted
the the ability to perform functions that it may not have
been intended for and therefore if compromised provides
a key attack vector to compromise third-party integration
between smart apps and smart devices in the household.
Poor authentication and authorisation frameworks and im-
plementation is also demonstrated in research carried out
by Jacoby [50], who demonstrated successful compromise
of his network-attached storage by exploiting the inse-
cure authentication measures of its web server application
(where the main configuration file containing account pass-
word hashes was made available to anyone on the internal
network). Jacoby also carried out a man-in-the-middle
attack against his smart TV by exploiting the cloud appli-
cation services used to populate multimedia information,
which was made possible due to a lack of authentication
or encryption used by the TV when downloading content
from the network and Internet.
4.2.2. CS-OS: Host OS
To effectively manage and scale heterogeneous devices
within the smart home and ensure practical usability for
the home user, control software tends to be designed to
operate through a single host operating system, such as
a smartphone or home hub. In the case of the former,
Android has become a popular OS platform in which to
develop smart home applications, but is also known for
having security flaws regarding application over-privilege
or cross-talk. For example, an attack against the Digi-
talSTROM home automation system [23] was practically
facilitated by exploiting the intent cross-app message func-
tionality provided by the Android OS for inter-communication
between applications. In an attack against the Wink relay
controller in [51], the privacy of the system was breached
through the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) service. In
2017, Neiderman reported that Tizen OS, Samsung’s IoT
operating system, which used extensively on washing ma-
chines, refrigerators and other appliances, was vulnerable
to at least forty zero-day attack vectors [52, 53]. Of note
was the observation that the particularly insecure strcpy()
function (superseded by strcpy s()) in the C language had
been used, even though it is widely known to easily lead to
buffer overflow conditions due a lack of bounds checking on
input size for the destinations fixed-length buffer. In this
case, the buffer overflow vulnerability enables an attacker
to execute arbitrary code on the OS, by injecting malicious
input which will trigger the applications memory stack to
overflow and execute the remaining bytes (which corre-
spond to the attacker’s code) with the permission rights
of the host program; which if running with root permis-
sions may grant control of the platform to the attacker.
4.3. CS-F: Firmware
Firmware configuration and type is often dependent on
the device circuitry, chipset and hardware board. There-
fore, many security vulnerabilities in smart homes are of-
ten device-specific, caused by flaws or lack of security pro-
tocols employed in their design or implementation. Here,
we have chosen a few indicative examples in a variety of
systems, starting with the lack of state validation in the
key exchange protocol handler programmed in the ZWave
door lock firmware of a smart lock analysed in [54]. An-
other example is the common vulnerability exposure code
issued to a dishwasher’s firmware web server [55], which
allows an attacker to traverse and map out the underlying
web directory and gain access to sensitive data, such as
configuration files and database credentials.
Firmware vulnerabilities identified in the WeMo con-
trol software were found to be related to the use of a pro-
prietary protocol that is router-dependent and piggybacks
across a household’s WiFi network. In 2013, researchers
discovered five vulnerabilities in WeMO related to hard-
coding of cryptographic keys, downloading firmware codes
without integrity checks based on the absence of a local
certificate to verify the integrity of SSL connections, clear-
text transmission of sensitive information, unintended proxy
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or intermediary protocol configuration and improper re-
striction of XML external entity referencing (which related
to the peerAddresses API which could be attacked through
XML injection potentially revealing contents of local de-
vice system files). These vulnerabilities were later issued in
a CERT advisory [56]. Indicatively, in the case of the un-
intended proxy, the flaw existed within WeMo’s use of the
universal plug and play over the session traversal for net-
work address translation (NAT) (STUN ) protocol, which
bypasses network address translation firewalls and conse-
quently enables attackers to connect directly to the WeMo
devices over the Internet. Of course, these vulnerabilities
were later patched in a firmware upgrade, but until then
would give attackers the ability to utilise WeMo devices
within a Botnet or conduct cyber-physical attacks, such
as flipping a switch at a very fast rate to cause electrical
damage. Until patched in newer versions, a vulnerability
on the firmware of Amazon Echo would allow raw audio
captured by the system microphone to be forwarded to
an attacker server. The attack required physical access to
the debug pads on the bottom of the device (after remov-
ing the rubber base), and attaching a secure digital (SD)
card to the diagnostic interfaces. From there, a persistent
implant was installed into the firmware to provide root ac-
cess, gaining remote shells and exfiltrating audio recording
[57].
In [58], the white hat hacker group Exploiteers dis-
closed firmware vulnerabilities in over 43 Internet of Things
devices from home automation devices such as the Wink
hub to an LG smart refrigerator. In most cases, inse-
cure access to the operating system via universal asyn-
chronous receiver/transmitter (UART) interfaces allowed
direct root access to system firmware for reverse engineer-
ing and injection of malicious code. Here, UART inter-
faces were found to be vulnerable due to the lack of secure
UART bootloader which utilise encryption and authenti-
cation. This is considered a standard method for offen-
sive exploitation of IoT systems, but one can argue that
this, and generally the vast majority of firmware attack
approaches, require physical access and are therefore of-
ten impractical. Of course, there is also the possibility of
a supply chain attack, where the firmware has been com-
promised before it reaches the buyer (see Section 4.5 for
more details).
4.3.1. CS-WA: Workflow automation
Beyond third party apps, the development of which re-
quires programming skills, users can create their own au-
tomated workflows and event-driven links with their smart
home systems, using If This Then that (IFTTT) applets,
Zapier worfklows, Stringify flows and other workflow au-
tomation services. An example IFTTT applet may set
“location of the user’s smartphone is at home” or “user’s
smartphone connected to home Wi-Fi” as the trigger and
“unlock the front door” as the action. In this case, an ad-
versary that might have found it impossible to target the
smart lock itself, may instead target one of the triggers in
the user-defined applet.
As workflow automation platforms can gain significant
access in defining, controlling and triggering system be-
haviour and interaction in the smart home, this makes
them a prime target for semantic social engineering at-
tacks [59]. Whilst an attacker may not necessarily target
a specific vulnerability in workflow automation platforms
themselves, a successfully crafted phishing email that de-
ceives a user into divulging their account’s username and
password potentially provides an attacker with the ability
to edit, delete and create new workflow automation rules in
the target household. By example, soon after Heartbleed
OpenSSL vulnerability was made public in 2014, attacks
began to craft phishing attacks targeting the IFTTT ser-
vice aiming to gain access to victims accounts by spoofing
emails requesting users to reset their passwords in light
of the vulnerability affecting account security [60]. De-
pending on the degree of integration and different systems
within the smart home, an attacker may have the ability
to exfiltrate data, delete rules as a form of denial of ser-
vice, as well as introduce new rules that would result in
physical impact (detailed in section 5).
4.4. S1: Sensory channel
While research in relation to the security of sensing
tends to focus on the data sharing, storage and process-
ing, attackers may also maliciously manipulate the process
at the level of data collection by exploiting physical weak-
nesses of the sensors themselves. Below, we have included
an indicative list of such sensory channel exploitations.
4.4.1. S1-U: Ultrasonic
Ultrasonic sensing is commonly used for physical secu-
rity applications in smart homes, for example for presence
detection [61], but is also applicable to indoor positioning
[62]. Ultrasonic sensing can be deceived by jamming the
signal and replaying it slightly later, so as to generate the
impression of longer physical distance [63] or by produc-
ing a new but similar ultrasonic pulse [64]. In some cases,
ultrasonic sensors can be bypassed by moving very slowly
in front of them or by wearing a costume made of anechoic
material that absorbs sound waves [65].
In 2017, ultrasonic attacks against a range of popular
voice-controlled smart home assistants were demonstrated
experimentally by generating human inaudible voice com-
mands in the 20 KHz frequency range that were detected
and processed. Zhang et al. have shown how to per-
form what they call a “Dolphin” attack [66] by modu-
lating low-frequency voice as baseband signals on an ul-
trasonic carrier, which are then effectively demodulated
by voice capture speech recognition systems on the receiv-
ing hardware. Their results have shown that 15 out of 16
voice control systems (consisting of both mobile devices
and home assistants, such as Amazon Echo Alexa) recog-
nised the ultrasonic voice commands and (where applica-
ble) 13 out of 13 platforms activated in response to the ul-
trasonic commands. However, it was also shown that the
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modulation parameters and maximum effective distance
for recognition and activation varies significantly between
different platforms. Nevertheless, the researchers demon-
strated how the attack can be performed in a mobile nature
using a relatively simple attack implementation, consist-
ing of a Samsung Galaxy S6 Edge smartphone, ultrasonic
transducer and a low-cost amplifier (where the transducer
and amplifier cost no more than 3 dollars). Given this
inexpensive and portable attack platform, the practicality
of executing remote-controlled rogue ultrasonic voice injec-
tion attacks becomes an attractive prospect for attackers
targeting voice-controlled systems.
Using the same premise, theoretically, an infrasonic
attack (which by current convention would be named a
“whale” attack) would pose the same threat to voice-controlled
system microphones that are able to detect acoustic noise
below 20Hz. To date, there have been no publicised infra-
sonic attacks against smart home or IoT systems. How-
ever, infrasound has been studied extensively as to its ad-
verse effects on human subjects and therefore any future
attack that aims to generate or inject infrasound in the
smart home could potentially lead to harmful effects on
occupants’ physical and mental well-being.
4.4.2. S1-V: Voice
Google assistant, Amazon’s Alexa and Apple’s Siri are
examples of personal assistant services that allow voice-
activated control of a rapidly expanding range of smart
home systems. From the perspective of security, voice
becomes a sensory channel for the transmission of smart
home actuation commands and exfiltration of information.
Yet, this is a channel that is not normally monitored by
technical cyber security measures. 1.
In addition, personal assistant services tend to offer
third party apps (CS-3PA), such as Google Assistant’s
Actions and Amazon Alexa’s Skills, which expand mas-
sively the range of systems and functionality that can
be controlled. Equally important is that modern voice-
activated systems do not need to learn their users’ voice,
as exemplified in 2017 by a Burger King television ad-
vert which activated voice-controlled Amazon Echo devices
by intentionally embedding a voice command [68] and by
the rogue dollhouse orders issued when “Alexa, can you
play dollhouse with me and get me a dollhouse?” was
heard on a television programme [69]. Consider a situa-
tion where a compromised smart toy [70, 71, 72] plays a
pre-recorded voice command, such as “Alexa, unlock front
1Although not in the context of smart homes, the principle of
exploiting the fact that a speaker-microphone pair is a security-wise
unmonitored communication link has been used by Diao et al. [67]
to bypass the permission settings of a smartphone. Their experi-
mental application needed only access to the speaker to whisper a
command such as “call x number”, which is picked up by the phone’s
microphone, and recognised by Google Voice Services, which in turn
initiates the call (also using text-to-speech to exfiltrate sensitive in-
formation)
door”, as demonstrated in Figure 5. In April 2018, se-
curity researchers from Checkmarx developed a proof-of-
concept malware that takes advantage of the platform’s
third-party app integration (see section 4.2.1, called Alexa
Skills, which puts the device in an continual audio record-
ing state to eavesdrop on audio in the household and then
export recorded transcripts to a third-party system [73].
By disguising the malware as a simple calculator app, ac-
tivated via “Alexa, open calculator”, the Echo API (Ama-
zon Lambda) associated with the skill launches a second
request to covertly record audio input. However, the activ-
ity can be visually detected by occupants if they recognise
that the blue light on the device (which indicates it is lis-
tening for voice input).
In 2016, research carried out in [74] demonstrated how
hidden voice commands can be carried out on personal as-
sistants and a range of smart device with voice-controlled
applications. The researchers were able to generate voice
commands, unintelligible to human listeners, but inter-
pretable by voice-controlled speech recognition systems in
smart devices. Using a black box model, they were able
to obfuscate commands with an audio mangler and using
Mel-Frequency Cepstrum transformation, without any un-
derstanding of the target system’s configuration (in this
case, the Google Nows speech recognition system). For
phrases “Ok Google” and “Turn airplane mode on”, the
Google system was able to interpret with 95% and 45% ac-
curacy respectively, compared to human transcribers’ 22%
and 24%. In the case of a white box approach, where an
attacker has full knowledge of the internals of the speech
recognition system, utilising a hidden Markov model (HMM),
the researchers generated a target audio phrase derived as
a sequence of HMM states compressed by minimising the
number of speech frames. Their testing showed that a
speech recognition system targeted (CMU Sphinx) accu-
rately interpreted 82% of obfuscated commands, compared
to 0% for human transcribers.
4.4.3. S1-IR: Infrared
The broad range of infrared applications varies from
communication between home appliances (IR remote), dis-
tance measuring or medical equipment such as medical fu-
sion pumps [75], where researchers have used an external
infrared transmitter to alter medication dosage. Recent
work carried out by researchers at Ben-Gurion Univer-
sity has demonstrated how CCTV security cameras with
infrared functionality can be used as a data exfiltration
medium to export data from a compromised device in an
air-gapped network [76]. Here, the researchers blink in-
frared LEDs in a morse-code-like pattern to transmit bi-
nary data to a receiver over a distance of tens of meters.
The attack functions by utilising the infrared light as a sen-
sory that can be encoded and decoded to exchange data.
By employing basic “on-off keying”, binary frequency-shift
keying and amplitude-shift keying modulation techniques,
the researchers have demonstrated that the absence / pres-
ence of a signal, the frequency of change and the illumi-
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nation of the light can be used to generate a bit datas-
tream for infiltration (e.g., command and control) or ex-
filtration of data, respectively. The attack positions smart
IR-enabled CCTV smart platforms as viable attack vec-
tors for steal sensitive data from a compromised smart
home network. The researchers have also highlighted that
the same vulnerabilities are likely to exist with doorbell
cameras equipped with IR LEDs, which are typically in-
stalled (unlike CCTV cameras) at locations and heights
which provide easier line of sight for an attacker to ex-
change data via IR signals.
4.5. S2: Supply Chain
The extreme diversity between devices, actuators and
sensors, as well as control software and third-party ap-
plications means that the smart home is particularly vul-
nerable to a supply chain attack. Here, were refer to the
supply chain as exploitation of the method of distribution
and delivery of hardware and/or software components for
devices in the smart home, whereby the supply chain po-
sitions an attacker to embed malware, gain control of, or
sabotage these devices and interdependent systems in the
household. As an example, the second-hand sale of smart
home technology in popular online marketplaces such as
Amazon and Ebay allows provides an ideal supply chain
for threat actors to distribute malware-infected products.
4.5.1. S2-S: Software
In 2014, a cyber espionage grouped named DragonFly
targeting supply chains in industrial control software sup-
pliers were found to be replacing legitimate files in suppli-
ers’ software distribution websites with their own malware-
infected versions of the software [77]. Specifically, the at-
tackers “trojanised” existing, legitimate industrial control
system (ICS) software by first compromising the website
of the software suppliers and replacing the existing ICS
software with malware-infected versions allowing remote
access. In smart home platforms, this attack targets a
legitimate and trusted software supply chain for house-
hold devices (e.g., providing firmware, operating system or
third-party software). A compromise of the software sup-
ply chain may result in subsequent attacks on smart home
devices control software as a result of installing compro-
mised software (see section 4.2).
Software supply chain threats can also be observed
through the side-loading of malicious applications on smart-
phones and tablets, where such devices are often applica-
tion control hubs for smart home automation and control.
Side-loading involves the installation of an application on
a smart device outside of the security of a monitored appli-
cation marketplace (e.g., Google Play, Apple App Store),
where the integrity of the software supplier cannot be ver-
ified. This may involve downloading an application via a
URL or advertisement hosted on a website or presented
through another app that is being used. In 2016, a re-
mote access Trojan called DroidJack posing as the popular
android application Pokemon Go was identified by secu-
rity company Proofpoint. At the time of discovery, Poke-
mon Go was not available in specific countries, whereby
the Trojan APK seemingly offered the application unoffi-
cially via a side-loading installation [78]. On installation,
in addition to standard Pokemon Go permissions, Droid-
Jack would additionally request access to read web history,
change network connectivity, directly call phone numbers,
edit text messages, record audio, modify contacts, as well
as retrieve apps running at startup. This would effectively
grant the malware complete control over the Android de-
vice, and as a result of any smart home devices controlled
by it. Inspection by analysts showed that three classes
had been added in the Trojanised app, with one of them
creating a channel to a hardcoded command and control
domain and port.
For smart homes, the software supply chain is particu-
larly vulnerable to audio/video streaming in social media
platforms, such as YouTube, where the provenance of data
is often unknown and can be uploaded by any user. Here,
voice-controlled systems are specifically targeted with the
aim to make speaker-equipped household devices play ma-
licious audio supplied through these services, as exempli-
fied by recent YouTube adverts and Television shows trig-
gering home automation systems [68, 79]. The media host-
ing entity in the software supply chain host can be trusted,
such as YouTube, or untrusted, such as illegal streaming
websites.
4.5.2. S2-H: Hardware
Supply chain attacks on hardware include physical dam-
age or tampering of system components used in the con-
struction of IoT devices (such as memory, wireless anten-
nas, interface buses, firmware etc.) or devices that have
been intercepted by attackers and compromised. The lat-
ter can involve sabotaging the integrity of an internal com-
ponent or inserting malicious implants, so as to provide the
attacker some form of control of the system when activated
[80].
4.6. S3: Side-Channel
Side-channel attacks are a well-studied area of research
in computer security, especially in the field of cryptog-
raphy for attempting to gain knowledge about a system
based on electromagnetic emanations from its hardware.
Such knowledge, such as frequency spectrum, power fluc-
tuations and electromagnetic interference provide insight
into the state of a system or the function it is perform-
ing. Side-channel attacks can also use modules present on
modern processors to create covert communication chan-
nels. In [81], the authors have used a hardware random
number generation module that operates across CPU cores
and virtual machines, to construct a covert channel with
a capacity of up to 200 kbit/s. Although the capacity
depends on the system’s load, the approach results in a
reliable and low-error channel. An approach that can
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exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers without audio
hardware and speakers has been presented in [82]. The
proposed approach uses noises emitted by the CPU and
chassis fans, and controls the acoustic signals they produce
using a specialised software. The binary data produced are
then transmitted to a nearby mobile phone. The method
achieved a transmission rate of 900 bits/hour and the au-
thors demonstrated that it can also be used for IoT devices
that contain fans of various sizes. In the following sections,
we further elaborate on the side-channel attacks related to
electromagnetic emanations and interference, as these are
more closely related to the context of a smart home.
4.6.1. S3-EMA (Electromagnetic Emanations)
Here, an example would be the electromagnetic emana-
tions leaking from unfiltered powerlines. In [83], Eney et
al. have demonstrated the viability of measuring a home’s
powerline activity with such accuracy that they could iden-
tify what the occupants were watching on television. Their
method was reproducible and accurate enough across a
wide range of modern television sets.
4.6.2. S3-EMI (Electromagnetic Interference)
Instead of passive eavesdropping emanations to elicit
information from a system, electromagnetic interference is
either an intentional or unintentional threat which disturbs
the correct operation of a system. In the smart home, it
has the potential to damage consumer electronics attached
to the powerline or used within a directional electromag-
netic antenna and has been used as an attack vector in
multiple real-world cases associated to robbery and caus-
ing criminal damage [84, 85]. Kune et al. have demon-
strated experimentally in [86] that at certain distances
electronic devices containing microphones are vulnerable
to injection of rogue radio signals.
5. Impact on systems:
A primary consideration in proposing this taxonomy
is the nature of impact that different cyber and cyber-
physical attacks can have on the occupants of a smart
home. Here, we follow the terminology introduced in [65],
where a cyber-physical attack is defined as a “security
breach in cyber space, which adversely affects physical
space, leading to breach of physical privacy, unauthorised
actuation, incorrect actuation, delayed actuation or pre-
vented actuation, as summarised in Table 2.
In terms of cyber impact, we adopt the standard CIA
triad of confidentiality, integrity, availability and include a
further property of non-repudiation. This is not exhaus-
tive, as authenticity and other extensions of the CIA triad
can be considered, but we argue that the four chosen are
of relatively higher priority in a smart home context.
5.1. Physical impact
5.1.1. P-BPP: Breach of physical privacy
While in the traditional grid, energy consumption in-
formation is collected once a month, the use of smart me-
ters allows frequent energy consumption reporting, typi-
cally in 15 or 30-minute intervals. The transmission of
highly granular energy data leads to the risk of eavesdrop-
ping attacks targeting valuable physical privacy informa-
tion about the presence of a household’s occupants at a
particular point in time or their lifestyles in the longer
term [88].
An attack demonstrated by Veracode demonstrated the
ability to breach physical privacy in a household by hijack-
ing the Wink Relay touch-enabled controller to turn on its
microphone and record audio in a household. Here, privacy
is breached through audio means, by taking advantage of
the Android Debug Bridge (ADB) [51]. ADB was later
disabled by the vendor in a subsequent software update.
Increasingly, smart home devices come equipped with
Internet access which are left poorly secured and as a
result expose vulnerabilities over physical privacy. For
example, Internet devicescanning search engines (such as
Shodan), allow attackers to identify open ports of nodes,
indexing the header or banner information of responsive
nodes; which can include information such device type,
model, vendor, firmware version other open protocols. As
Lin and Bergmann have identified in [2], simple queries
such as “has screenshot:true port:554” on Shodan returns
a list of cameras, their IP addresses, geographic location
and captured screen-shots. More often than not, results
include both internal and external home surveillance sys-
tems; granting malicious actors remote visibility over ev-
erything (including other devices which could be used for
further, lateral intrusion) in the smart home.
Real-world threats to smart home privacy have been
materially observed in recent vulnerabilities in home video
baby-monitor devices. Over the past three years, a number
of reports have identified vulnerable baby monitor cam-
eras, which allowed perpetrators to visually spy on chil-
dren [89, 90, 91].
5.1.2. P-UA: Unauthorised actuation
Any attack leading to the hijacking of a smart home’s
actuation commands could lead to unauthorised actuation.
Here, an example would be the unlocking of a smart lock
[70, 54], as well as the unauthorised switching on or off
of lights, heating, ventilation, air conditioning, etc. A
network traversal vulnerability discovered in WeMo smart
home devices provided attackers with the ability to remote
connect and execute commands that would allow them to
be utilise in a botnet or to cause physical damage such as
electrical faults.
5.1.3. P-IA: Incorrect actuation
At small scale, a simple related attack would be one
that would continuously increase the temperature read-
13
Figure 3: Impact on system’s taxonomy criteria
Table 2: Definitions of physical impact on systems
Physical Impact Definition
Breach of physical privacy Be watched, listened to, or recorded against one’s wishes [87]
Unauthorised actuation Actuation initiated without the approval of an authorised user [65]
Incorrect actuation Actuation not as required by authorised user [65]
Delayed actuation Actuation initiated or completed later than desired by authorised user [65]
Prevented actuation Authorised user unable to initiate desired actuation [65]
ings of a thermostat, forcing it to keep lowering the tem-
perature in the rooms. At much larger scale, cyber at-
tacks against smart homes at community level could cause
large-area power system blackouts through cascading ef-
fects. Liu et al. [92] have studied analytically and via
simulation adversarial cases, where an attacker manipu-
lates the electricity price to overload transmission lines by
forming peak energy loads, or increases the energy load’s
fluctuation to disturb the power system dynamics. Both
lead to cascading outages in the power grid.
Incorrect actuation can also occur as a result of “un-
intentional actuation”, that is, actuation executed as a re-
sult of automatic functionality configured through a users
smart home appliance. For example, in [38] the researchers
explain how the August and Danalock smart lock appli-
ances automatically unlock the doors they are connected
to when the occupier (with the smartphone app and a
Bluetooth BLE connectivity) is within a 50 metre radius.
However, these locks assume that occupants always enters
and leaves via the same door and therefore automatically
unlocks the same door when the occupant is within the
BLE connectivity radius. In shared accommodation or
areas with high crime rates such behaviour is highly un-
desirable.
5.1.4. P-DA: Delayed actuation
Attacks affecting the availability of a smart home’s
communication network can lead to delayed transmission
of commands and consequently delayed actuation. The
smart home ZigBee sinkhole attack in [32] demonstrated
how a rogue node can advertise itself as a favourable route
to a ZigBee controller, whereby ZigBee sensors (contain-
ing actuation commands) which utilise the rogue node for
data transport may result in a delayed actuation if the
rogue node drop or manipulates the data.
P-PA: Prevented actuation
One popular feature provided by smart home technol-
ogy providers is vacation mode, typically involving turning
on and off of lights and other devices, so as to create the
impression that the occupants are in while they are away.
Fernandes, Jung and Prakash [49] have proposed a “dis-
abling vacation mode” attack, where their own SmartApp
interferes with the occupancy simulation by raising a false
mode change event. This prevents the actuation expected
by the occupants while they are away.
5.2. Cyber impact
C-C: Confidentiality
Here, an example is the door lock pin code snooping
attack demonstrated in [49]. In their proof of concept im-
plementation, the authors have developed a battery mon-
itor SmartApp, which exploits an over-privilege issue in
Samsung’s SmartThings environment, to view plain text
pin codes and leak them via a short message service (SMS)
message. Unauthorised access to this information would
likely lead to unauthorised physical actuation as a second-
order physical effect (P-UA).
5.2.1. C-I: Integrity
Breaching the integrity of data or a service is a common
route for a cyber-physical attack targeting actuation. In
14
that sense, most cyber security breaches in a smart home
will involve some form of unauthorised manipulation of
data. An interesting early example would be the mal-
ware infections caused by digital photo frames reported in
2009 [93]. The infection would occur when some of these
devices were connected to a computer via USB to load
new photos. In 2014, a large scale phishing attack dis-
covered was discovered by Proofpoint [94], where it was
found that source-addresses of phishing messages included
smart home appliances such as internet-connected fridges,
where it was surmised that these devices were likely used as
message relays/proxies for forwarding the malicious emails
which is a common practice in obfuscating the source of a
phishing campaign.
5.2.2. C-A: Availability
Common examples of availability attacks are denial of
service and jamming. In a Wi-Fi based smart home, de-
nial of service would involve first gain access to the home
network and then flooding with meaningless network traf-
fic its smart devices, such as security cameras, rendering
them unable to receive commands or transmit data. Com-
munication jamming has also been studied extensively for
some of the main communication protocols used in smart
homes. For example, Jokar, Nicanfar and Leung [95] have
demonstrated wide-band denial, pulse denial and jamming
designed specifically for IEEE 802.15.4, which is the basis
for ZigBee.
An major threat to the cloud-supported availability of
the smart home was exemplified by a major Amazon Web
Services outage on February 27th 2017, for which many
IoT smart home vendors rely on for cloud services. The
outage of the AWS S3 storage platform resulted in multiple
vendors system going down and a many reports from smart
home occupants claiming that they were unable to turn
off appliances such as WiFi connected ovens, alarms and
loss of functionality for physical security appliances and
multimedia systems [96].
5.2.3. C-NP: Non-repudiation
Within the smart home, non-repudiation is associated
to an occupant’s ability to provide evidence that distin-
guishes legitimate computer activity generated by them-
selves or fellow occupants and activity which has been ex-
ecuted by a malicious actor. Here, examples include a
compromised smart meter which increases the energy con-
sumption [97] and rogue payments through home assis-
tants using audio-based attack vectors [79]. Future risks
may well include compromised devices (such as smart fridges
[98]), which are under the command and control of a bot-
net [99] or used as message relays for attack communica-
tions.
6. Impact on domestic life:
We have proposed a number of potential attack vec-
tors and associated physical and cyber impacts, which al-
most certainly have wider applicability beyond the scope
and context of the smart home (e.g., smart city, hospital,
school, warehouse etc.). However, another primary mo-
tivation for this taxonomy is to identify specifically how
such threats, within the unique smart home setting, di-
rectly affect domestic life.
Smart home environments aiming to enhance home se-
curity [100], well-being, especially for the elderly and dis-
abled [101, 102, 103], energy efficiency and financial sav-
ings [104], and enable greater workspace and vocational
flexibility, are expected to provide a significant positive
impact to domestic life. Paradoxically, by merging cy-
ber and physical worlds, they introduce new threats to
each of these aspects. As a result, confidence in smart
home technologies and consequently their adoption is un-
dermined where cyber security is not proportionate to real-
istic threats to home security, well-being, energy efficiency,
household finances and vocational flexibility.
6.1. DC: Direct Consequences
Cyber attacks aim to interfere with the usage of devices
or services that are provided to the user, where the effects
can have direct and possibly long term consequences on
the users life. One of the most common consequences,
and indeed purposes, is related to financial aspects of a
successful attack. For example, ransomware [105] limits a
user’s ability to use devices or services that are targeted
in the attack until they pay a required amount. Targets
for this type of attacks are most often companies, but at-
tacks on homes may increase significantly. Possibilities
of threats and actual attacks make the home an unsafe
environment that can effect a users well-being. cyber at-
tacks can be aimed toward users health, physical health
through interference with implantable and wearable medi-
cal devices [106], and toward psychological well-being. In-
trusion to a user’s home in the form of different cyber
attacks can affect their psychological well-being through
decreased privacy [107, 8], loss of control [108, 109] and
inconvenience.
6.1.1. DC-F: Financial
Financial loss due to the cyber attack of IoT devices
at home can be consequence of a burglary, increase of
the household bills, malware infection of the user’s soft-
ware, possible blackmails after spying household members
or children, access to a bank account, malfunction of de-
vices or usage of a user’s confidential information for mak-
ing unauthorised purchases.
PenTest Partners developed the first Ransomware for
smart thermostats that effectively gives an attacker to con-
trol the temperature of a household [97]. By exploiting
the Adobe Air package contained in the system files of the
thermostats linux image, the researchers were able to gain
root access to activate the heating and cooling in a house-
hold at the same time; wasting lots of power and increasing
the energy bills of the homeowner. At the same time they
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Figure 4: Impact on domestic life taxonomy criteria
were then able to lock users out of the thermostat by ap-
plying a pin to the device.
6.1.2. DC-V: Vocational
Over the past few decades, the increase in technol-
ogy availability in the home has enabled it to become an
increasingly productive environment for remote working.
For example, the office for national statistics in the UK
reported that from 1998 to 2014, the proportion of people
working from home in the UK rose from 2.9 million to 4.9
million [110]. However, increase in home working and the
advancement of ubiquitous connectivity in the household is
symptomatically increasing organisations’ exposure to cy-
ber threats which users are not equipped to mitigate; espe-
cially if organisations rely solely on a locked-down laptop
and VPN software or router for defence. For instance, it
is common practice for employees to discuss business mat-
ters and share company information and data by voice or
video (e.g., conference calls), which may be confidential. In
the past, threats to this communication medium were low
as only very targeted attacks (such as physical bugging)
posed a risk. In the smart home, this information may
now be picked up more easily by exploiting poorly pro-
tected IoT devices with built-in microphone systems, such
as personal assistant services (e.g., Google Home, Amazon
Echo), children toys and other voice-controlled house-hold
appliances.
Using a different perspective outside of cyber risk, an
article by Digitist magazine [111] considered the smart
home as an environment that may begin to have an ad-
verse impact on employee productivity due to constant in-
terruptions by smart devices and their activity within the
household; which in turn could force organisations away
from popular home working models.
6.2. DC-S: Health and Safety
Here, we refer to impact on physical health rather than
emotional health. In one of the first security analyses pub-
lished for smart lights [112], researchers from the Univer-
sity of Washington investigated whether it is possible to
cause physical harm in an exploited smart home. Their
hypothesis was that one avenue for this would be to cause
compact fluorescent lamps to explode. Although three of
the 10 in their experiments did explode, the effect was
not significant. It was perhaps more significant that by
taking control of the lamps, they were also able to pro-
duce fluctuations at an appropriate frequency to induce
seizures, which would be harmful to occupants suffering
from epilepsy. This is not an attack that can be discarded
as unrealistic. There has been at least one case of a real-
world security breach that had such aim (albeit not in
the context of a smart home). In 2008, the website of
not-for-profit Epilepsy Foundations website was defaced,
introducing flashing animations chosen to cause migraines
or seizures to visitors that suffer from epilepsy. At least
some of the visitors were affected [113]. Also, more re-
cently, a journalist known to suffer from epilepsy received
a twitter message reading “You deserve a seizure for your
posts” along with an animated image showing a blinding
strobe light, which did in fact cause him a seizure. The
person behind the message was arrested a few months later
[114].
More recently, household gas cookers have been re-
leased with WiFi connectivity that allows for remotely con-
trol of the oven with the physical presence of occupants;
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through the use of an Android application that even in-
cludes a chat function [115]. Although there have been no
examples of exploitation to date, the security of the oven is
underpinned by both the protection of the mobile applica-
tion and WiFi environment in which it has been employed.
Were such a device to be successfully exploited, the phys-
ical consequences could be severe.
6.2.1. DC-P: Invasion of privacy
As complementary to cyber impact through loss of con-
fidentiality (IS-C-C) and physical impact through a breach
of physical privacy (IS-P-BPP), here we focus on impact
to privacy from the psychological perspective; that is, the
regulated activity carried out by an occupant experiencing
a violation of privacy with respect to psychological dimen-
sions of privacy (solitude, reserve, isolation, anonymity, in-
timacy) [116]. Apart from the obvious threat of breaching
physical privacy by physical means, an invasion of privacy
would occur when an unauthorised party received unac-
ceptable or inappropriate access to someones personal in-
formation [117]. In 2012, empirical research carried out by
Oulasvirta et al. [8] demonstrated that breaching the psy-
chological dimensions of privacy causes annoyance, con-
cern, anxiety and even rage for household occupants. Fo-
cusing on continuous video surveillance within homes, the
researchers found that the potential of invasion of these
dimensions of privacy through video surveillance causes
noticeable changes in the behaviour of the participants.
Participants were consistently aware of the surveillance
and exhibited privacy-seeking behaviour through ceasing
specific behaviour completely, hiding, acting privately and
manipulating sensors, as well as changing their practices to
actively avoid surveillance (e.g., meeting outside the home
for private conversations). This kind of behaviour is ex-
pected for occupants of a smart home who perceive that
their physical privacy may be breached through a com-
promised IoT device that captures audio or video. Early
examples of real world compromise have been reported
for Internet-connected baby monitors [89]. However, as
IoT devices through sensing and actuation continue to
augment domestic life, such as tracking occupant activity
(e.g., from taking a shower to cooking and evening meal or
sleeping), an invasion of privacy extends to recording daily
life, habitual schedules and activity recognition. Whilst
experimental results for video surveillance in the home pro-
vide early indications of occupant behaviour when there is
a noticeable invasion of privacy, understanding how oc-
cupants will respond to a realisation that they are being
observed in data through a compromised smart home me-
ter, light bulb, scale or TV is an important challenge.
6.2.2. DC-LC: Loss of control
Control over devices is one of the purposes of the usage
of the IoT devices, and it could be taken away through dif-
ferent forms of cyber attacks. Loss of control is manifested
through taking control away from a user where third party
gains partial or complete control and access over user’s IoT
devices and household. Loss of the control over the situ-
ation can be perceived as threatening while increases in
perception of control are associated with better physical
health, greater social support, self-acceptance, a sense of
purpose in life, autonomy, mastery, growth and positive
relationships and a general sense of satisfaction with the
quality of ones life and general wellbeing [109]. An ex-
ample of the cyber attack with control loss can be random
triggering alarms in the users or activation of different IoT
devices with a goal of creating fearful and threatening sit-
uation.
6.2.3. DC-I: Inconvenience
One of the most obvious direct consequences of cyber
attacks is inconvenience caused by interruption of func-
tionality of IoT devices in the situations when users expect
to rely on them. It can be manifested through time con-
suming as opposed to time saving that should be one of the
benefits of usage of the IoT devices. Programmed morn-
ing routines with the purpose of saving time (alarm clock,
preparing coffee, heating the home, closing the garage or
entrance doors) can easily become an additional task for
users if they have to deal with delay, malfunctioning or
failure of the programmed IoT devices ([96]). Instead of
enjoying initially desired automation of everyday functions
users can face the opposite outcome if their devices are at-
tacked.
6.3. UX: User experience
The degree by which a cyber attack in the smart home
is visible to household occupants depends on its immedi-
ate or long term effects on the user experience of systems
which have been affected. For example, attacks that are
noticeable in the moment of the execution (by activation of
different devices [60], jamming of traffic [118], or resulting
in the loss of control over devices [97]) can immediately
activate occupants’ awareness that their household may
be under attack. On the other hand, some cyber attacks
are more discreet in execution, such as providing a back-
door to control devices [56] or to conduct recognaissance
[48], which may not be immediately obvious to occupants
until a such time that they observe anomalous system be-
haviour, or never at all if the attack does not impact or
alter system functionality and performance.
Users of IoT devices are often unaware of cyber at-
tacks or when their devices are used for malicious pur-
poses ([119]), which leads to a lack of action and decreases
actions of prevention as well (especially where technical
defences are unable address such threats).
6.3.1. UX-N1: Instantly noticeable
As occupants of the smart home begin to rely on smart
devices and systems for every day tasks, disruption to the
services can indicate either a malfunction or also a poten-
tial cyber threat. In both cases, household users may im-
mediately notice degradation of performance, such as de-
creased responsiveness of IoT devices, delayed, prevented
17
actuation, incorrect or unauthorised activation of alarms,
garage doors etc. In general, an attack in the household
that would be instantly noticeable is an attack where the
user notices that they have either lost control of their
household devices or that someone else is controlling them
as well [56, 51, 97].
6.3.2. UX-N2: Noticeable over time
Certain attacks against the smart home do not gen-
erate cyber and/or physical impact which is immediately
obvious or noticeable by a user. For example, where an
attacker has gained remote access to a system such as se-
curity camera or baby monitor unless the occupant is ac-
tively trying to access the system at the same time they
may be unaware some else is logged in and viewing the
video feed [90]. However, over a period of time, behaviours
exhibited by targeted systems or second-order symptoms
observed in interdependent platforms may generate a visi-
ble footprint in which household users become aware that
an exploitation has occurred or is indeed still on-going.
6.3.3. UX-NN: Not noticeable
In the case where an attack is not noticeable by house-
hold occupants, attack vectors tend to focus on gaining
persistent remote access (rather than denying a system)
in order to conduct further reconnaissance, such as pene-
trating the network further through lateral movement into
other devices [25] or to gain passive control over household
systems as a means to launch external attacks on other
platforms; building a botnet of smart devices [56].
In general, more often than not, users are not aware
that their IoT devices are being attacked, irrespective of
whether an attack exhibits anomalous behaviours that are
visibly obvious. Nevertheless, attacks that are able to in-
filtrate the smart home without exhibiting noticeable signs
to household occupants pose a significant threat to occu-
pants safety and well-being; especially if technical defences
are also unable to detect them.
6.4. E: Emotional
The home is meant to be a safe haven to experience pri-
vacy, control and personal autonomy. A cyberspace viola-
tion affecting a smart home may thus lead to considerable
and long-lasting emotional impact. Attacks may even be
designed specifically to cause the occupant to experience
high levels of stress and discomfort, for example by trigger-
ing fake alarms, as demonstrated in [49], where the authors
have shown how to raise fake physical device events, such
as the report of increased levels of carbon monoxide. In a
recent occurrence, the hijacking of an Internet-connected
teddy bear resulted in two million voice recordings be-
tween parents and children being made publicly available
on the internet [120]. Further, Pentest Partners demon-
strated how it is possible to gain complete root access
to an Internet-enabled adult sex toy, capturing streaming
video from the device and changing its configuration [121].
In both cases, access to such sensitive and private infor-
mation leads to significant emotional impact and second
order threats, from blackmailing, publicly shaming on the
Internet, damaging a persons reputation, or gaining access
to other systems the occupants may use in the household
(e.g., by stealing Wi-Fi passwords). In fact, eliciting a
particular emotional response from a household occupant,
with or without their knowledge, can be used as part of a
social engineering attack [59].
More generally, emotional distress as a consequence of
a cyber attack is related to personal sense of the loss of con-
trol and privacy, a decreased ability to function on a daily
basis, to work, and even long-lasting deleterious financial
and legal consequences. The realisation that one is a vic-
tim of such an attack, specifically targeting the intimacy
of one’s home, can trigger an emotional experience akin to
physical abuse, in the process also leading to lower trust
levels in IoT technology. Further, such emotional conse-
quences are likely to be felt and re-lived over significant
periods of times, over months or years. Once an occupant
realises they have been a victim of an attack and progres-
sively acquires the full understanding of the consequences,
it is likely they will experience relapses of related emotional
events, affecting their personal well-being and recovering
process, and will have to engage in renewed coping strate-
gies, to mitigate such emotional consequences. Whereas
there is no theoretical framework that fully describes the
emotional engagement of IoT users, a significant under-
standing, we posit, can be gained by drawing inspiration
from emotional psychology. An emotional experience can
be measured and compared, and serve in the elaboration
of user models and the prediction of behaviour. Com-
munities, comprising cyber-security specialists, industrial
interests and policy makers, can benefit from this informa-
tion to delineate features and courses of conduct that will
place the user’s well-being at the centre of the design of
IoT and smart home technology, as well as to help formu-
late training to condition emotional responses as result of
suspected or realised attacks.
An emotional experience is best described over time at
the specific granularity that pertains to the aspects that
one seeks to exemplify [122]: In other words, emotional
reactions will vary in duration and amplitude, function to
contextual and personal aspects. Following a smart home
cyber security incident, the immediate aftermath is the
realisation that an attack has occurred, and gradually be-
coming aware of its consequences, as victims evaluate di-
mensions of the event against their personal belief system
and core personality. In the longer term, the user reacts
and copes with the consequences, involving a series of emo-
tional states in relation to the recovering process. Whereas
the long term scale corresponds to broader emotional expe-
riences, the immediate aftermath relates to the evaluative
processes that support the personal understanding of the
event by the user. Importantly, evaluative processes both
drive the amplitude of the experience over time and deter-
mine the emotions perceived, such as anger and irritation
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[123], that is the valenced reactions that ensue. In addi-
tion to evaluative processes, emotional reactions typically
comprise reactions in four other systems, action tenden-
cies, bodily reactions, expression and subjective feeling,
which can also be measured. Activation in all five systems
determine the shape, content and intensity of emotional
experience [122].
6.4.1. E-A: Appraisal
Evaluative processes following a smart home cyber se-
curity breach are most likely to engage strongly dimensions
about familiarity, privacy, coping resources and power [124].
The same attack can be appraised differently by different
persons, depending on personality [125], expectations and
level of knowledge about risks and the consequences of
the breached security [126]. The ensuing emotion process
depends on the precise appraisal that is made by the per-
son. In the case of a man-in-the-middle media injection
attack on a smart TV [50], a user becomes instantly aware
that a smart TV is controlled by a third-party. While
the attacker is controlling the changing of videos, content
images, links or audio files, the user will realise that their
device is hijacked and begin to think about how to stop ex-
posure to unwanted content. This is especially the case if
the content is not appropriate for children, or if it is harm-
ful for the user (e.g., videos that cause epileptic seizures).
Appraisal actions here can lead to thoughts about invaded
privacy, loss of control, about who is behind the attack and
whether the attack is aimed specifically at the victim or if
it is random. Instead of immediate action, here different
appraisals may inadvertently increase an occupant’s expo-
sure to the attacker by leading them to an evaluative state
that does not result in a direct mitigating action (e.g., by
removing device network connectivity to disrupt attacker
control).
6.4.2. E-AT: Action tendencies
Action tendencies are tendencies to behave in certain
ways that are elicited by the emotion process [127]. Ex-
perience of the attack can range from having a desire to
escape from the situation and to stop using devices, to in-
vesting all effort into solving the problem that occurred
[124]. Beris et al. [126] have shown that depending on risk
perception and emotional stance toward breached security,
a range of different tendencies to act can occur. Categori-
sation of different attitudes and behaviours could be used
to predict which members of the household are the “weak-
est links” and, with their attitude towards IoT devices
increase the home’s cyber risk, and as a result need edu-
cation or training. Intrusion in the private life and space
can make people ready to defend their privacy with any
available means. Acting from emotional affect is known
to bring intensive reactions of fighting for the justice, es-
pecially when anger and fear are experienced [128, 129].
Dramatic cybercrime consequences, in the form of suicide,
are found at both ends, attackers side [130] as well as the
victim’s side [131]. Ambiguous and geographically diverse
legislation for cyber crime [132] has its share in expectancy,
predictability and differences in behavioural outcomes re-
lated to cyber attacks.
6.4.3. E-B: Bodily symptoms
Possible bodily symptoms [127] during a cyber attack
can include hyperventilation, blood pressure and heart
beat increases [124]. An interesting recent example of re-
lated research is the experiment carried out by Canetti
et al. [133], which used salivary cortisol as a measure of
the stress caused, to show that cyber attacks make people
more likely to express threat perceptions. The intensity
of bodily reactions as a result of cyber attack events de-
pends on initial psychological and physical condition of the
users, as well as the level of integration and dependency
occupants place on smart home systems. Symptoms can
also depend on the nature of the cyber attack, and if it
was especially aimed to harm a users health. Direct inten-
tion to harm a specific person was shown in the case of an
epileptic journalist who suffered a seizure after viewing an
image that was sent purposely to him, with the intention
of causing seizure, as a punishment for his online posts
[114].
6.4.4. E-EX: Expression
Possible emotional reactions [127] could range from a
hopeless expressionless reaction to shaking, frowning and
saying loud angry words [124]. Individuals differ whether
they are emotionally expressive or unexpressive [134]. Gross
and Levenson (1993) showed that emotional expression can
be reduced by suppression, but that suppression would not
have an effect on a subjective experience of emotion. In
the case of an attack on the Home assistant audio loop de-
nial of service, a user could repeatedly try to activate the
system by using voice commands, and experience inconve-
nience and annoyance with malfunction of the devices by
using loud angry words which can further increase stress.
Another person would not express their emotions, but that
should not be taken as a sign that the person is not expe-
riencing intensive unpleasant emotions.
6.4.5. E-SF: Subjective feeling
Subjective feeling refers to the subjective experience
that characterises the emotion [127]. The situation of be-
ing a victim of a cyber attack presents a stressful event
for victims who are likely to experience negative feelings
such as anger, fear, sadness, insecurity and shame often
accompanied with the feeling of surprise [124]. In a study
on adolescents [135], it was found that those with greater
Internet attachment were more likely to experience cyber
victimisation and greater symptoms of anxiety and de-
pression. With reliance on IoT devices in the home, it
is important to take such results into account to develop
strategies for decreasing negative impacts of attachment to
IoT technology and possible emotional difficulties. In the
case of hacking of baby monitors, parents experience an
intensive fear for the privacy of their child, as well as fear
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of potential abuse of the observed and recorded material.
It will also lead to anger, which in turn can escalate into
undesired actions.
6.5. Emotion regulation and coping
6.5.1. ERC-:Emotional Regulation
The most prevalent approach to emotion regulation
emphasises reappraisal and suppression [136] as its two
different styles. It includes re-evaluation of the situation
with the goal of better coping with it, and it can modify an
emotional impact. In the case of cyber attack in the house-
hold, a person can realise that impact of the attack is not
significant, and choose to continue as it did not happen.
The adaptive aspect of this style is that a person contin-
ues as there was no attack, while the maladaptive aspect
can include repetition of the attack as a consequence of
the lack of any activity to protect the household. Sup-
pression includes inhibition of expression of the emotional
process [136]. which can have beneficial impact by de-
creasing emotional expression and negative emotions, but
can also stimulate ignorance of the real threats that would
need attention to be prevented. Rumination is another
emotion regulation style which includes repetitive and re-
current focus on the reasons for the situation that occurred
[137].
After a cyber attack in one’s smart home, emotions can
maintain for a while as well as action tendencies that ac-
company them, so feeling of violation, shame, anxiety and
anger can persist as well as desire for justice or revenge can
occur [124]. Persistence of emotions related to the cyber
attack could bring to behaviour that include changing IoT
devices as a result of dissatisfaction with the protection
[124].
6.5.2. ERC-:Actual behaviour
Actual behaviour depends on the context, emotional
processes and emotional regulation. In order to know how
a person actually behaves during and after a cyber attack
in the smart home, one needs to know more about be-
haviour that is emotionally driven and more about accom-
panied emotional processes (appraisal of the event, action
tendencies, bodily reactions, expression, and subjective
feeling). The component process model offers [123, 138]
an integrative theoretical frame to understand all phases
of the emotional process and reactions, which are crucial to
understand an emotional impact of cyber attack on users
well-being.
7. Taxonomic classification examples
In this section, we provide an example of four hypo-
thetical attack scenarios that are practically facilitated by
a combination of insecure smart home devices, configu-
rations and automation rules defined by household occu-
pants. We then classify 24 different smart home cyber
threats against the taxonomy criteria to identify shared
characteristics between threats that help to identify key
areas for developing defences.
For each attack, in Table 3 we provide an overview of
taxonomy classification and in Figures 5, 6 and 7 taxo-
nomic attack graphs. Here, an attack graph represents a
time-based model of taxonomic classification for a smart
home attack to establish interdependent attack character-
istics and elicit key interactions between attack vectors
and associated impact to help formulate approaches of po-
tential defence. In Table 3, although we acknowledge that
a becoming aware that one has been the victim of any of
such attacks will elicit an emotional reaction, we provide
a prediction as to which emotional components would be
most strongly involved, for attacks that a victim are more
likely to perceive as threatening. This distinction allows us
to distinguish, for instance, attacks that would simply be
annoying, e.g. powerline jamming, versus attacks that are
more personal and would thus be more saliant, e.g. baby
monitor back-door internet reconnaissance. Whereas the
former would elicit cognitive evaluations and some kind
of an emotional expression, the latter attack is likely to
include much more visceral reactions.
In each attack graph, we also visually encapsulate spe-
cific classification criteria within three distinct areas of
study (threat prevent, detection and cyber-physical crime
victim support) to highlight attack characteristics which
would provide meaningful information to researchers and
developers of technical defences, as well as researchers and
practitioners of behavioural, environmental and emotional
psychology science. For example, in the case of the lat-
ter, analysing a specific attacks cyber-physical impact and
associated affects on domestic life in the smart home can
help to develop understanding and processes for support-
ing victims of these kind of attacks. Below we describe
each area of study and provide indicative selection criteria
within an attack graph:
1. Threat prevention. This is an approach to de-
fence that relies on preemptive measures to mitigate
threats. Examples include identifying and patch-
ing vulnerabilities in devices or software, enforcing
multi-factor authentication, blocking system actions
or responses that are potentially dangerous (this may
include potentially danger user actions or automa-
tion rules that an occupant is attempting to config-
ure). Typically, threat prevention relies on a robust
understanding of the technical security of protocols,
software and hardware devices deployed with a smart
home and establishing rules and protections for se-
cure inter-communication.
2. Threat detection. This is a pro-active control in
defending against attacks, whereby a crucial com-
ponent in identifying anomalous or known malicious
activity pro-actively (for triggering threat prevention
mechanisms) is the ability to collect and audit inter-
actions between systems in the household (whether
machine-to-machine, or machine-to-human). Here,
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Figure 5: Example of household audio sniffing and injection attack and taxonomic attack graph of rogue voice-injection actuation (arrowhead
lines indicate attack impact steps, dashed lines indicate second-order impact facilitated by a previous step in the same category, but not
directly caused by it)
this relies on being able to measure and analyse the
footprint generated by cyber-physical systems in a
household for intrusion detection; whereby the ag-
gregation of cyber and physical indicators can help
establish measurable relationship between attack vec-
tors and their associated impact [17].
3. Cyber-physical crime victim support. A suc-
cessful cyber attack in the smart home can have a
profound effect on domestic life, with direct conse-
quences leading to financial loss, breaches of health
and safety, as well as cascading emotional impact se-
riously impacting occupants physical and psycholog-
ical well-being. Understanding how different kinds
of cyber and physical impact in a smart home cyber
attack affect domestic life, can help to inform the
development of processes and systems for support of
such victims.
7.1. Second-order threats to Smart homes: vulnerabilities
in configuration and automation
Following on from the Attack Vector and Impact on
Systems categories described in the previous section, here
we demonstrate how the combination of different inter-
acting technologies in the smart home can expose fur-
ther second-order vulnerabilities which manifest as a con-
sequence of automation and system configuration in the
smart home.
Rogue voice-injection actuation
Here we demonstrate the viability of audio sniffing and
injection as cyber threat through the Cayla Doll [72]. In
Figure 5, an attacker with local proximity (e.g., 30 m de-
pending on equipment) connects to the Cayla Doll ’s open
Bluetooth interface (1), activates the microphone function
to record occupant conversations (2) (here a comparative
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Figure 6: Example of household WiFi de-authentication attack on targeted WiFi endpoints and taxonomic attack graph of household WiFi
de-authentication attack (arrowhead lines indicate attack impact steps, dashed lines indicate second-order impact facilitated by a previous
step in the same category, but not directly caused by it)
approach would be to exploit a compromised Bluetooth
enabled device such a smart phone or tablet the same at-
tack vector exists (2)). The attacker plays a voice audio
file through the Cayla doll (or Bluetooth smart device)
speaker (3) which relays the command via a home au-
tomation hub (e.g., Amazon Echo), or directly to a voice-
controlled actuation/sensing device (4) to execute actua-
tion on a sensor - in this case unlocking a smart lock on
the front door when the occupants are not in [107]. To-
day, most smart locks require a pin in order to perform
locking and unlocking from audio or an app, however the
remote audio access provided by the Cayla Doll this pin
can recorded when it is used and replayed later to unlock
the front door. Obviously, audio sniffing and rogue in-
jection can be used to conduct a host activities (such as
ordering equipment from Amazon via the Echo), however
here it is the automation configuration within the house-
hold the facilities the attack end-to-end; requiring only a
single vulnerable device (i.e., Cayla Doll) to compromise
the otherwise secure systems (Echo, smart lock etc.). Fig-
ure 5 also shows the respective the attack graph taxonomy
classification for rogue voice-injection attack.
WiFi de-authentication (with Evil-Twin)
Here, we describe the execution of a WiFi Evil Twin
attack through de-authenticating a households WiFi de-
vices. In Figure 5, an attacker with local proximity (e.g.,
30 to 100 m depending on equipment) scans (1) for WiFi
access points using a portable WiFi de-authentication de-
vice [29]. On selecting a target WiFi access point, (2)
the attacker identifies connected WiFi nodes and targets
specific MAC address to de-authenticate from the WiFi ac-
cess point. On receiving de-authentication requests from
the attacker for targeted endpoints MACs (3), the WiFi
access point de-authenticates the endpoints from the WiFi
network. At this stage, the attacker has launched a dupli-
cate access point with a spoofed SSID and MAC address
of the household WiFi at a greater signal-strength than
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Figure 7: Example of workflow account phishing and injection of automation rules in compromised account and taxonomic attack graph of
workflow account phishing and rule injection attack (arrowhead lines indicate attack impact steps, dashed lines indicate second-order impact
facilitated by a previous step in the same category, but not directly caused by it)
the legitiamte household access point (4), where the de-
authenticated endpoints configurations automatically re-
connect, but this time to the attacker access point. On
connection to the Evil Twin WiFi, the endpoints attempt
to conduct a WPA 4-way handshake and inadvertently re-
veal the household WiFi password allowing the attacker to
both sniff all the traffic of the connected endpoints, con-
duct denial of service against them, as well as access the
household WiFi for further exploitation. An alternative,
at stage 4, would be to prompt for a password to the Evil
Twin WiFi access point where occupants would manually
supply the household WiFi password [27]. Figure 6 also
shows the respective attack graph taxonomy classification
for the Evil Twin WiFi de-authentication attack.
Workflow automation phishing
In this attack, we show how a semantic social engineer-
ing attack [59] can be used to gain cyber-physical control
of a smart home by utilising targeted phishing e-mails to
capture household occupants credentials to worfklow au-
tomation platforms (note IFTTT is shown here as a hypo-
thetical example, but crucially has been subject to related
semantic attacks in 2014 [60]). Initially an attacker will
craft a targeted e-mail to an occupant requesting them to
reset their IFTTT credentials through a malicious URL
(1), which subsequently leads the occupant to a spoofed
login webpage for IFTTT (2), assuming the occupant is
deceived and enters their credentials they are redirected
to the legitimate website whilst at the same time supply-
ing their IFTTT credentials to the attacker. The attacker
now has access to the occupants account in which existing
integration with household devices and system is available
to the attacker to manipulate, in Figure 7 we assume that
the household have integrated their internal video camera
CCTV system (which also has motion detection capabil-
ities). Using this particular scenario, the attacker is now
free to add an existing trigger event to the camera system
(3), which sends a picture from the camera to them on ac-
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Table 3: Taxonomic classification of smart home cyber threats
Ref Threat Description Attack Vector (AV)
Impact on Systems (IS) Impact on Domestic Life (DC)
Cyber Physical Direct Consequences UX Emotional
[13] Power-line device jamming CM-WD-X C-A P-PA DC-LC, DC-I UX-N1 E-A, E-AT, E-Exp
[97] Thermostat embedded ransomware and root access CS-3PA, CS-OS C-A, C-NP P-UA, P-PA DC-F, DC-S, DC-LC, DC-I UX-N1 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[55] Dishwasher web server directory traversal CS-F C-C, C-A P-UA, P-IA DC-F, DC-S, DC-LC, DC-I UX-NN -
[25] Lightbulb to Lightbulb WiFi credentials sniffing CS-WI-W C-C P-BPP DC-F, DC-V DC-LC UX-NN -
[64] Ultrasonic presence sensor spoofing S1-U C-I P-IA DC-S, DC-LC UX-N1 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-S
[90] Baby monitor back-door Internet reconnaissance CM-WI-W, CS-3PA C-C P-BPP DC-S, DC-LC, DC-I, DC-P UX-N2 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[38] BLE automated smart lock door opening CM-WI-B, CS-3PA C-I P-IA DC-F, DC-S, DC-LC UX-N2 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[70] Spoofed voice activating smart lock CM-WI-B, S1-V C-I P-UA DC-F, DC-S, DC-LC UX-N2 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[72] Doctored eDoll app apk CS-3PA C-I P-IA DC-F, DC-S, DC-LC UX-N2 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[83] Side-channel power-line data sniffing S1-EMI C-I P-BPP DC-V,DC-S UX-NN -
[51] Audio eavesdropping through smart hub controller CS-3PA C-I C-BPP DC-F, DC-V UX-NN -
[48] Insteon node ID sniffing CM-WD-I C-C P-BPP DC-LC UX-NN -
[93] Digital photo frame malware CS-OS C-I P-UA DC-F, DC-LC UX-N2 E-A, E-AT, E-Exp
[92] Smart home power generator tripping CS-F C-A P-PA DC-F,DC-V,DC-S, DC-I UX-N1 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[23] Device data/sensor readings exfiltration CM-WD-D, CS-3PA C-C P-BPP DC-F, DC-S, DC-LC UX-NN -
[139] Home assistant audio loop denial of service S1-V C-I P-IA, P-UA DC-LC, DC-I UX-N1 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[49] Smart lock backdoor pin code injection CS-3PA C-I P-IA DC-F,DC-V,DC-S, DC-I UX-NN -
[96] AWS S3 cloud-service outage denial of service CS-3PA, CS-OS C-A P-IA, P-PA DC-S, DC-LC, DC-I UX-N1 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[32] ZigBee sinkhole attack CM-WI-Z1 C-I P-PA, P-DA, IA DC-LC, DC-I UX-N2 E-A, E-AT, E-Ex
[56] Remote access for WeMo command and control CM-WI-W C-I, C-C P-UA, P-PA DC-F,DC-S, DC-LC UX-N2 E-A, E-AT, E-Ex
[50] Man-in-the-middle smart TV injection CS-3PA C-C, C-I, P-BPP DC-F, DC-I, DC-LC UX-N1 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[79] Rogue payment via audio-triggered home assistant S1-V C-I P-UA DC-F, DC-LC UX-N2 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[19] Rogue HomePlug AV network infiltration CM-WD-H C-C, C-I P-BPP DC-F,DC-LC,DC-S UX-N2 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
[29] WiFi device de-authentication CM-WI-W, CS-F C-A, C-I P-PA DC-LC, DC-I UX-N1 E-A, E-AT, E-Ex
[60] Workflow automation phishing CS-3PA, CS-WA C-A, C-C P-PA DC-LC, DC-I UX-N1 E-A, E-AT, E-B, E-Ex, E-SF
tivation of the camera’s motion sensor detection. Consid-
ering this breach of physical privacy in the household and
the relative simplicity of executing this semantic attack to
gain such access, the impact can be particular sinister. For
example, in this household scenario, were the attacker aim-
ing to capture indecent pictures of children, by accessing
the camera system and adjusting the worfklow automation
platform rules they are able to forward pictures which may
capture activity of the child living in this household every-
time the child activates the motion sensor. Figure 7 also
shows the respective the attack graph taxonomy classifi-
cation for a workflow automation phishing attack.
8. Defending against cyber-physical threats in the
smart home
Security in the smart home is quickly becoming a com-
plex and unique information security challenge in its own
right. The emergence of pervasive and heterogeneous machine-
to-machine and human-to-machine connectivity in the house-
hold forms a formidable threat landscape that combines
actuators, sensors, computational, electronic and mechan-
ical devices and humans. So, it is not only the adoption
of vulnerable Internet-connected devices that places the
smart home at risk, but also the cyber-physical fusion of
previously isolated systems, where the effects of an at-
tack in cyberspace (e.g., exploiting a smart home device’s
cloud service software) may now result to impact in physi-
cal space (e.g., turning on the cooker’s gas stove) [65]. Al-
though the concept of the smart home is still maturing, so-
phisticated attack vectors have already moved from the re-
search lab environment to real-world deployment [99, 94],
which means that it is now imperative that defenses are
developed to protect against attack vectors that would un-
dermine the uptake and practical benefits of smart home
technology.
There are many facets of traditional cyber security that
apply to the smart home, as well as elements of security
which have much wider application. For example, at an
IoT device level, chipset manufactures have proposed ar-
chitectures [140, 141] and developed dedicated hardware
security modules for secure boot and firmware integrity,
authentication and update security [142], all of which are
highly applicable to the security of devices in smart cities
and industrial environments. However, in the context of
the smart home, defence that relies on hardware modules
dedicated to firmware device security can be impractical,
as it is primarily a pre-emptive security control by nature,
and typically required to be integrated in devices at the
design and development stage, thus leaving many existing
devices in the household without these components vulner-
able to attack. Here, our focus is specifically on defences
that have been designed for or evaluated specifically on
smart homes.
As early as 2000, the concept of securing embedded
smart home systems was first explored by Al-Muhtadi et
al. [143], who introduced a prototype extension of the
SESAME (Secure European System for Applications in a
Multi-vendor Environment) security protocol [144]. Their
adapted Tiny SESAME system utilised an embedded Java
virtual machine module to perform the SESAME proto-
col’s functions for authentication, authorisation, confiden-
tiality, integrity and access services within resource con-
strained smart home devices. The researchers presented
an experimental deployment within a smart home testbed
consisting of Tiny SESAME equipped toaster, door, video-
cassette recorder, alarm system and fridge. However, no
actual attacks on the security platform were evaluated to
demonstrate its empirical utility.
Naturally, early research on the security of smart homes
relates to authentication and authorisation. A simple ap-
proach implemented by Qutayri et al. [145] in 2008 re-
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quires the user to enter a username and a password, which
is sent via SMS to a home server that establishes the au-
thenticity of the user against a database. Then, the home
server initiates a session including the phone number that
sent the SMS and a randomly generated number which
expires after the session ends. The users are assigned ac-
cess levels based on their role (e.g., a supervisor can setup
accounts for other users), and there is also provision for
encryption of the communication between the mobile sta-
tion and the home server. The same year, Jeong et al.
[146] explored the idea of using low-cost smartcards for au-
thentication, focusing particularly on the challenges posed
by smart home devices’ resource restrictions. What they
proposed was a lightweight scheme based on a one-time
password protocol and simple operations using one-way
hash functions, so as to incur very low computation load.
The protocol assumes that a symmetric key is shared be-
tween a home gateway server and an integrated authen-
tication server, which sits outside the home network, is
trusted by the users and performs authentication, autho-
risation and accounting. Users are authenticated through
single-sign-on and can access other home services without
additional authentication procedures. The protocol was
analysed only theoretically and rather briefly for replay,
man-in-the-middle, denial of service and stolen-verifier at-
tacks, and there was no practical implementation or ex-
perimental evaluation of its practicality.
Chifor et al. [147] have introduced a lightweight iden-
tity stack providing a digital identity to the users and the
individual devices. Its purpose is to be integrated in ex-
isting operating systems or smart home IoT frameworks.
The application scenario is on a smart home device which
is connected to an untrusted Cloud platform and relays
input commands to a users smartphone for authorisation.
Their work extends the authentication messages of the
passwordless ”Fast IDentity Online” (FIDO) mode, which
was originally designed for smartphones. Some degree of
theft resistance is achieved by adding a keep-alive mech-
anism. The authors ensured that their approach is prac-
tical from a network delay perspective by implementing
and evaluating it on the open-source Kaa IoT Cloud plat-
form. The delay added for 30 nodes was around 150-200
ms, which should be acceptable for most smart home ap-
plications. However, this value did not take into account
the time taken by the cryptographic operations running on
the devices, as this part of their evaluation was simulated
on a desktop device.
Much less lightweight but certainly attractive is the di-
rection of utilising Blockchain technologies to decentralise
security measures. While generally very challenging in
terms of computational overhead, energy consumption and
network delays, it has been shown by [148] et al. that a
lightweight instantiation eliminating the concepts of coins
and of Proof of Work can be practical in a smart home.
In their proposed system, each smart home is equipped
with a “miner” device, which is both powerful and always
online, and is responsible for handling all communication
within and external to the home. The miner also preserves
a private blockchain, which controls and audits communi-
cations. Evaluated in simulation, their system appears to
introduce only minimal overhead in terms of traffic, pro-
cessing time and energy consumption. Along similar lines,
the European project GHOST [149] proposes a defence in-
frastructure where it is the integrity of the code running
on smart home gateways that is certified by the use of
Blockchain technology. However, this work has not yet
been evaluated experimentally.
Rahmati et al. [150] have observed that emerging smart
home platforms use permission models, which, inspired by
smartphone operating systems, group functionally simi-
lar device operations into separate units and require users
to grant apps access to devices at that granularity. This
leads to overprivileged access for apps that do not require
access to all of the granted device operations, and higher
risk to users than needed because physical device oper-
ations are risk-asymmetric. For instance, from their ex-
ample, “door.unlock” provides access to burglars, while
“door.lock” may lead to getting locked out. So, the au-
thors have argued that the combination of overprivileged
apps and mixed-risk operations increases the damage po-
tential. Their solution is to move away from grouping
based on functional similarity to grouping based on risk
similarity. Their proposed scheme, Tyche, uses app rewrit-
ing techniques to enforce risk-based permissions. Through
a survey of 400 users, they measured risk perceptions for
different types of smart home cyber threats that could be
caused by overprivilege. Based on their findings, they
grouped a physical devices operations into three groups
of risk (low, medium, high), for 146 operations across 61
types of devices. Evaluating this new model on three exist-
ing SmartApps, they found that these apps can be written
in a way that reduces access to high-risk operations by
60% without decreasing functionality or increasing user
decision overhead.
Beyond preventative measures, such as authentication
and authorisation, researchers have also worked on se-
curity monitoring, verification, detection, countermeasure
decision support and other more active security measures.
For example, assuming a software defined network (SDN)
underlying the infrastructure for a smart home, Wang et
al. [151] have proposed a model whereby Android pro-
grams perform dynamic taint propagation to analyse the
spread of risks posed by suspicious apps connected to a
smart home’s gateway. For each taint path, probabilis-
tic risk analysis assists the defender in recognising net-
work threats caused by malware infection and to estimate
the losses of associated taint sources. They incorporated
a finite state machine to represent the taint propagation
analysis situations at various configuration settings and
deployments of safeguards. Their experimental evaluation
was performed on a smart home setup involving a smart
home gateway, a SDN controller, and OpenFlow switch
and a wireless access point. Using behavioural analysis
associated with 60 families of real malware, they showed
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that the approach is promising, especially as the number
of taint paths associated with the propagation rules dis-
covered through taint analysis is increased.
In the wider sphere of information security, there is
currently a distinct lack of digital forensics methodologies
for IoT and cyber-physical systems. Some initial work has
been carried out by Do et al. [152] on smart home informa-
tion gathering for the purposes of digital forensics. A first
model is evaluated on the forensic examination of LIFX
smart lights and a Belkin WEMO switch, starting from a
passive forensic adversary constrained by the strict princi-
ples of forensic soundness and comparing against stronger
adversaries with reduced constraints. While generalisation
beyond these devices is risky, an interesting observation is
that even the passive forensic adversary can obtain signif-
icant evidential data, such as determining the identities
and locations of devices.
In the commercial space, traditional anti-virus vendors
have entered the emerging smart home security market by
adapting the concept of traditional unified threat man-
agement gatewaysm commonly deployed within enterprise
networks, for smart home networks. Platforms developed
by Norton [119], F-Secure [153], McAfee [154], BitDefender
[153], Dojo [155] and Cujo [156] seemlessly integrate into
household networks by either replacing an existing home
WiFi router or by assuming the role of its network gateway
to the Internet. Each vendor security platform are very
similar in design to each other and employ conceptually
the same security architecture and protection mechanisms.
For example, in order to provide access to high-end threat
detection capabilities (historically reserved to enterprise
security systems) via a resource-constrained home router,
network and device data is collected by each platform lo-
cally and then sent to vendor cloud infrastructure where
the smart home data is processed by proprietary threat
detection analytics using machine learning and heuristics
algorithms to establish attack signatures. This architec-
ture allows for efficient crowd-sourcing of threat detection
which is shared between all smart home subscribers of
the security platform (as per the approach taken by mod-
ern anti-virus software). It is here where a wide array
of security services such as anti-malware/virus protection,
parental access control, secure DNS services, deep packet
inspection, intrusion detection and prevention functional-
ity, authentication and authorisation policy, as well as user
security incident reporting and system configuration dash-
boards are provided; the latter in the form of an online or
mobile user application.
Whilst the concept of oﬄoading resource intensive threat
detection to the cloud certainly provides an economical
and practical means to provider high-end security services
in the household, it remains unclear how such systems can
respond dynamically and autonomously to cyber-physical
threats in real-time; especially as access to the advanced
threat detection capabilities of the vendor cloud system is
subject to end-to-end network delay and Internet availabil-
ity. Current commercial smart home security platforms fo-
cus almost entirely on IP network and device traffic analy-
sis, which constitutes only a small portion of the potential
connectivity landscape in the smart home. As shown in
section 1, smart home attacks vectors can manifest over a
vast set of different communication mediums, control sys-
tems and sensory channels, that so far have received little
attention from a security monitoring perspective. There-
fore, in practice, sole reliance on traditional IP network
analysis for capturing the full remit of existing and future
potential cyber threats in the household is no longer suffi-
cient.
9. Open research challenges
9.1. Smart home living labs for cyber security research
Experimentation in IoT is progressing well across the
research community, but usually at the level of individ-
ual devices, especially when users are involved. However,
there is much less progress in developing smart home liv-
ing labs, so as to be able to evaluate different threats, their
impact and the effectiveness and appropriateness of corre-
sponding countermeasures in the real conditions of living
in a household. This would allow to study the second order
effects of different attacks and exploitation of interdepen-
dencies and unwanted interactions between systems, such
as the “rogue voice-injection actuation” example presented
in Section 7.1. It would also allow to study the human-
system interaction considerations of smart home cyber se-
curity, and the additional challenge introduced by the po-
tentially different preferences and cyber security attitudes
of the different members of a household.
9.2. Cyber-physical intrusion detection for smart homes
Similarly to cyber-physical systems [17, 157], intrusion
detection not only can benefit from but may even necessi-
tate the use of data sources from physical space, in addi-
tion to network and processing data. For example, attacks
that exploit the audio link between devices (such as the
speaker of a babycam issuing a voice activation command)
cannot be detected by monitoring only network traffic, as
in conventional network environments. Similarly, informa-
tion from physical sensors (such as occupancy sensors) on
the absence of occupants a home at a specific point in time
can be valuable information for the detection of command
injection attacks.
9.3. Privacy metrics for smart homes
The vast majority of IoT technologies employ a cloud
approach, even if not strictly necessary for technical rea-
sons. For example, a simple on/off actuation command
for a smart lightbulb could be delivered directly from the
user’s smartphone to the smart lights hub and to the light
bulb. Instead, most manufacturers involve transmission of
this information to their cloud, which raises privacy con-
cerns. At the same time, the presence or not of people in
a smart home can be inferred through the level of wireless
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network activity (e.g., of ZigBee traffic). IoT privacy is
currently a vibrant area of research, looking at IoT sys-
tems usually in isolation. In the context of a smart home,
an interesting research question is whether it is possible to
define smart home privacy metrics (i.e., how much privacy
is offered by a smart home of a given configuration?).
9.4. Support for smart home security breach victims
While for physical crime, societies have created a range
of support systems for the victims, there is no equivalent
provision for cyber crime. For victims of cyber attacks in
smart homes, where there may be physical damage caused
and the emotional impact can be profound, there is per-
haps greater need for establishing frameworks for recover-
ing from the cyber and physical damage caused, and also
for designing counselling to be provided to the occupants
affected. As we have shown in section 7, here the tax-
onomy attack graphs can help to guide investigations for
different smart home attacks (to highlight key attack be-
haviours) in order to aid understanding of their impact on
victims.
9.5. Smart home cyber hygiene and Human-as-a-Security-
Sensor
A common approach towards prevention of cyber threats
is to improve the security posture of individuals and or-
ganisations by developing guidance and advice for imple-
menting basic security measures (e.g., keeping software up-
dated, using multi-factor authentication online, choosing
complex passwords etc.). However, existing “cyber hy-
giene” recommendations are likely to cover only a small
portion of the smart home threat landscape, especially as
many attack vectors manifest as a result of cyber-physical
connectivity. We anticipate that new smart home cyber
hygiene efforts leading to the definition of simple, best-
practice techniques for IoT systems in the household will
lead to improved prevention and detection efficacy against
cyber-physical threats by equipping users with the efficacy
to detect potential threats to the household through a core
set of recommendations (e.g., that it probably is not good
security practice to connect one’s cooker to the cloud via
their WiFi network if it cannot be turned off when the
service is unavailable [96]). Linked to this is the Human-
as-a-Security-Sensor (HaaSS) paradigm of actively involv-
ing users as human sensors. The concept has already been
proven for conventional desktop systems [158], but in the
space-constrained interface of smartphones and embedded
systems within smart homes environments, the user is af-
forded a lot less information or time to spot suspicious
activity and the potential impact of threats can introduce
physical and emotional consequences which influence user
decision making processes. Development of mechanisms
for HaaSS reporting, as well as measuring the reliability of
these reports can facilitate integration within a technical
smart home security platform. User telemetry helps influ-
ence the decision making and response of defence systems,
but also augments threat detection performance through
human sensing of context, which a technical system would
not have access to. Furthermore, by integrating the user
as part of the defence, second-order benefits may be re-
alised, such as conditioning the emotional state of users
when exposed to the impact of an attack or the nurturing
of proactive coping strategies to tune user response in a
way that supports defense.
9.6. The cyber security economics of smart homes
The introduction of cyber security in smart homes nat-
urally comes with increased financial costs for the manu-
facturers and buyers, but also carries an economic value
in terms of the assets and wellbeing of occupants that it
contributes in protecting. Related concepts, such as se-
curity pricing, security investment [159] and cyber insur-
ance [160] at the level of organisations and enterprise net-
work environments, are being investigated, but there is no
equivalent work for smart homes. Of particular interest
is the concept of smart home cyber insurance, which can
complement traditional home insurance.
10. Conclusions
A first hurdle in carrying out research on the security
of smart homes is to identify the mechanisms for launch-
ing attacks against them and their potential impact. We
have conducted a survey of cyber threats in a smart home
environment and produced a taxonomy to categorise these
threats systematically, considering the attack vectors, as
well as the impact on systems and consequently on the
occupants of a smart home. Taking into consideration the
different characteristics of these attacks, we have also iden-
tified where existing technical defences practical to house-
hold users are applicable to address such threats. In doing
so, we have aimed to help establish the problem space,
allowing researchers from a variety of disciplines to iden-
tify areas where they can contribute, and specifically for
cyber-physical and IoT security researchers to pick attacks
and systems for evaluating their technologies.
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